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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Political, economic, and military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
Union has increased in scope in the recent years, with both superpowers paying closer 
attention to the Pacific Ocean region. The United States has traditionally been a Pacific 
nation, with extensive territorial and commercial interests extending beyond its Western 
seaboard; despite having possessed a Pacific coast for some time, the Soviet Union has 
become an important actor in the region only recently. Both nations have manifested 
their increased interest in the Pacific by expansions of their strategic military concerns in 
the region. In the case of the Gnited States, the value of its economic and political ties in 
the region is reflected by the place accorded in U.S. military strategy to defending allies 
and protecting U.S. interests in the Pacific. In the 1980s, U.S . strategy has undergone 
some changes; most visibly, U.S. naval strategy has gained more prominence within 
overall military strategy. At the same time, it has seemed that naval strategy has 
accorded additional importance to the Pacific region. 
. This thesis will consider the naval strategy of the United States and its effects in 
the Pacific. Because of the fact tha t the U.S. has long defined the Soviet Union as its 
major antagonist in world affairs, Soviet interests, naval strategy, and forces in the Far 
East have importan t implications fo r the development of U.S. strategy. Chapter Two 
examines changes that have t aken place in Soviet military strategy over the past ten 
years, and the place that t he Soviet ~avy has within overall military strategy. The 
missions of the Soviet ~avy are considered in t he context of changes which have occurred 
in Soviet military strategy. There has been an illcrease in t he level and quality of Soviet 
naval forces in the Pacific in recent years; the relationship between this development and 
Soviet strategy in the region will be discussed. 
Soviet naval expansion in the Pacific is one factor which has appeared to drive the 
U.S. military buildup in this decade; apparently , a redefinition of the scope of U.S. 
military strategy , and particularly naval strategy, has been another factor. Chapter 
Three considers the extent of changes to U.S. military strategy that have taken place 
since the advent of the Reagan Administration in 1981. In this decade , the strategy of 
the U.S . :\favy has been in t he limelight, as a new declaratory strategy has been 
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developed. The na tu re of changes t o th e \'av y's st rategy will be analyzed, and th e 
implications of the new :Ylaritime Strategy for U.S . concerns in t he Pacific will be 
discussed. Finally , t his chapter examines U.S. interests and forces in t he P aci fic, in light 
of the effects of the Yiaritime Strategy. 
The Maritime Strategy has been very controversial; several facets have drawn 
criticism, particularly t hose which emphasize operations in the Pacific. Chapter Four 
considers a series of criticisms which have been levelled at the ~faritime Strategy, in an 
effort to determine t he validity of the criticisms, and to arrive at some conclusions 
regarding the usefulness of the Maritime Strategy for achieving the goals set by overall 
U.S. military strategy. 
Both superpowers have stressed the strategic importance of t he Pacific in recent 
years; the United States has been particularly concerned, in the 1980s, to adjust its 
military strategy to better cope with challenges to U.S. interests in t he Pacific. The 
major perceived t hreat is the Sovie t Union; U.S. mili t ary st rategy since the late 1940s has 
placed t he need to preserve deterrence of the Soviet Union at the top of its list of 
priorities, both in terms of global de terrence and regional deterrence. U.S . naval strategy, 
as a component of military strategy, IS defined with t his same priority in mind. The 
:Vlaritime Strategy which has been enunciated seeks to provide a framework by which the 
~avy can contribute to U.S. national objectives including deterrence, protection of allies , 
and prot ection of U.S. interests; the concern expressed in the ~avy ' s strategy for 
operations in t he Pacific reflects the increased importance of this region for the United 
States. U.S. naval strategy in the Pacific has been designed to enhance deterence of the 
Soviet Union and prov ide the outline for protecting U.S. interests in the region. This 
thesis a ttempts to determine whether t he ylaritime Strategy can indeed achieve the goals 
set for it. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Soviet Naval Strategy and Developments in the Pacific 
2.1 Introduction 
Among the most important factors in the development of military strategy is the 
perception of the strategy and capabilities which are held by an enemy, and the 
assessment of the best means to counter the enemy's strategy and forces. In the period 
since World War II, the United States has perceived the Soviet Union as the primary 
threat to its national security and to American interests worldwide; today , "the Soviet 
Union remains the major military threat to the United States and its interests. They 
persist in an unrelenting arms buildup that has con tin ued for more than 20 years." 1 
Consequently , Soviet mili tary strategy and mili tary capabiE ties are central considerations 
in the development of U.s. military strategy and the means for its execution. The 
perceptions of t he Soviet threat on the part of members of the U.s. military establishment 
determine the countervailing strategy that will be developed. 
Among recent changes in the nature of the Soviet threat, improvements and 
additions to Soviet naval forces have caused particular concern t o Americq,n officials. The 
growth of Soviet naval power has been cited as " one of the most dramatic developments 
of t he post-World War II period .... ,,2 Former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations , Admiral 
James D. Watkins, has written that" ... the need for a sound strategy has grown all the 
more important as the Soviets developed a formidable blue-water Navy able to challenge 
U.S. interests worldwide. :,)3 One of the primary factors that has caused the U.S. Nav y to 
review its strategy is t he broadened scope of Soviet activity outside of Europe, which 
includes their" ... extensive maritime operations, especially from facilities at Cam Ranh , 
Vietnam; and the general buildup of air and naval forces in t he Pacific. ,,4 
This chapter considers the place of the Soviet navy within overall Soviet military 
strategy, with at t ention to recent changes in both the overall strategy and its naval 
component. The particular missions of t he Soviet navy will be considered, again with 
reference t o shifts in doctrine. Finally , the specific developlneuts of the Soviet Navy in 
the Pacific will be discussed, in an a ttempt to identify the Soviet naval missions and 
capabilities in this region, and to determine possible changes in mISSIOns that have been 
brought about by strategic innovations and improvements in capabilities. 
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2.2 Soviet Naval Strategy 
2.2.1 The Context: Soviet Military Strategy 
The determination of t he objectives and key tenets of overall Soviet military 
strategy is based upon the analysis of Soviet military writings on strategy as well as upon 
the statements and writings of key civilian political officials , particularly the General 
Secretaries of the Communist Party. Such analyses have been undertaken by both 
civilian and military experts .in the United States; most American observers" ... agree on a 
broad range of noncontroversial objectives and supporting policies that correlate closely 
with visible Soviet force posture." 5 This discussion of Soviet military strategy will deal 
with the elements that are most commonly and widely asserted to be included in that 
strategy. 
2.2.1.1 The Elements of Soviet Strategy 
The military strategy of the USSR is designed to provide a framework for the 
achievement of national goals by the employment of military power. The development of 
military doctrine and strategy are closely tied to t he foreign policy goals which the USSR 
pursues, in accordance with the notion that military power should be subordinate to 
political objectives. Three broad aims of Soviet foreign policy can be distinguished: 
... the avoidance of general nuclear war, which, once begun, would be 
uncon trollable in its course and cataclysmic in its consequences .... a 
determination to ensure the safety of Russian territory and that of the Eastern 
European states which are considered as essential to Russia 's own 
. security .... [and] her third external aim of enlarging her national and ideological 
influence at the expense of her two main rivals, the United States and China. 6 
However , should the CSSR become involved in a war, both their nuclear and conventional 
declaratory doctrines stress that "victory" is the ultimate objective. 7 The use or 
t hreatened use of military power is also considered important in peacetime contingencies , 
again as a means of securing political objectives. Soviet strategy , "both in peacetime 
political competition and in t he ultimate t est of a central conflict: ~ t ends j to see all force 
elements as contributing to a unified strategic purpose, national survival and t he 
elimination or containment of enemies on the periphery. " 8 Deterrence and achievement 
of policy objectives, and the ability to be victorious in a war if it should occur, appear to 
be the central goals of Soviet s trategy. 
The means for the implementation of the strategy , as implied above , are t he total 
military forces available t o the USSR. Soviet strategy distinguishes roles for strategic 
nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, and conventional forces. Military wri t ings 
suggest that the USSR considers that " ... a future war with the West will be global in 
scope, violent , and decisive. " 9 From t his deduction follow a number of implications for 
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the various elements of the Soviet armed forces. and t heir missions in t he case of a war: 
however, the conclusion thdt a war with the \Vest would be global and violent does not 
necessarily imply that it need be a nuclear war. American officials feel that" even in such 
a war the Soviets would not use nuclear weapons lightly , preferring to achieve their goals 
wi th con ven tional means. n 10 Soviet mili tary doctrine concerning escalation to nuclear 
weapons is ambiguous: though nuclear weapons are seen as a means of complementing 
conventional weapons to achieve a swift victory, there is also evidence which indicates 
that the USS R acknowledges, at least to some extent, the danger of escalation, and 
consequently would be prepared to withhold nuclear missiles as a retaliatory threat to 
prevent the U.S. from 'going nuclear. d1 
Especially in the past ten years , Soviet political and military leaders have appeared 
to reconsider and redefine some elements of the military strategy in an attempt to develop 
a more flexible spectrum of response options for warfighting. The main forces available to 
the Soviet leaders remain the same, but there seem to be more emphases upon the 
possibility of limited conflicts than in earlier periods. The following sections consider 
more specifically th e Soviet doctrines for the use of strategic nuclear weapons, tactical 
nuclear weapons, and conventional forces. 
2.2.1.2 Soviet Nuclear Warfighting Strategy 
The basic contention of Soviet nuclear weapons strategy is that victory could and 
should be sought in the event of a general nuclear war, but at the same time there IS a 
recognition of the potential devastation that a nuclear war could cause and an acceptance 
of the existence of mutual deterrence. The doctrine for the use of strategic nuclear 
weapons in the event of a war has been broadly defined in the USSR for the past twenty 
years. In the early 19605, General Secretary Khrushchev and others argued that nuclear 
war was unthinkable, because of the threat of world destruction, and had generally come 
to accept " ... the theses on the non-inevitability, non-necessity, and non-expediency of 
nuclear war .... ,,12 However, orthodox military strategists continued to consider the 
possibility that nuclear war might occur and to develop doctrines for use in fighting, and 
avowedly winning such a war. In 1968, Marshal V.D. Sokolovskij, a former Chief of t he 
General Staff, reflected this warfighting strategy in his book, Soviet MtIitary Strategy: 
under conditions of nuclear rocket war the resolution of the main aims and 
problems of war will be accomplished by strategic rocket troops by delivery of 
massed nuclear rocket strikes. Ground troops, with the aid of aviation will 
perform important strategic functions in modern war: by rapid offensive 
movement they will completely annihilate the remaining enemy formations , 
occupy enemy territory and prevent the enemy from invading one 's own 
t erritory.13 
This clearly indicates that general nuclear war, though potentially catastrophic , IS a 
con tingency for which Soviet miIi tary planners have attempted to devise a strategy. 
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_-\nalysts agree that this emphasis on being able to fight and win a nuclear war, if it 
comes, remains a central t enet of Soviet nuclear doctrine; but there is also widespread 
agreement that the emphasis has shifted away from strictly strategic nuclear options 
towards selective employment of tactical nuclear weapons, with even some suggestion 
hat the Soviet Union contemplates the possibility of a full-scale, all-conventional war 
wi th the West. Soviet declaratory doctrine for strategic nuclear weapons"' ... con tin ues to 
be predicated upon the assumption that if a general nuclear war should occur, all 
elements of the armed forces would contribute to waging a decisive struggle aimed at 
defeating world imperialism." 14 However, though victory is still the strategic goal, the 
Soviet Union lacks the capabilities to achieve it. IS By adopting a warfighting posture, 
the Soviets seek to provide the most credible deterrent to the actual occurence of a 
nuclear war, while maintaining a contingent resort if deterrence should fail. 16 Both force 
developments and declaratory policy indicate that the USSR has decreased its emphasis 
upon the strategic nuclear deterrent and has moved towards acquiring more balanced and 
capable military forces. 
2.2.1.3 Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
The emphasis in Soviet declaratory doctrine regarding tactical nuclear weapons is 
upon their utility for achieving victory in a war. Soviet doctrine has accepted that a clear 
dividing line exists between strategic and theatre nuclear weapons; however, the division 
between conventional war and theatre nuclear war is less distinct,17 which conceivably 
enhapces the chance that tactical nuclear weapons would be used to support conventional 
forces in the event of a war. Should deterrence fail, Soviet strategy prescribes offensive 
operations to secure the initiative and to more effectively achieve their goals; ,., theater 
nuclear and chemical capabilities, fully integrated into doctrine, stand ready to reinforce 
con ven tional activities." 18 The date that is generally agreed upon for the beginning of 
Soviet attention to tactical nuclear weapons strategy is the mid-1970s; about that time, 
the CSSR act.ively began planning for limited nuclear conflicts, and Soviet literature 
suggested that its military planners had embraced the notion that nuclear war could be 
fought without issuing in attacks upon the superpowers ' homelands. 19 By 1977, the 
Soviet Union had made the distiction between nuclear war involving homelands and that 
involving other areas more clear, and had added the notion that, " ... given the profusion of 
nuclear-capable systems at sea, and the nuclear thrust of US naval expansion, nuclear war 
at sea might not be avoidable.,,20 The issue of nuclear war at sea will be considered in a 
subsequent section which focuses upon the missions of the Navy in the framework of 
Soviet strategy. It is clear that Soviet military strategy, while accepting the division 
between conventional and nuclear forces, places a great value upon the contingent 
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employment of t ac t ical nuclear weapons as a means of achieving vic t ory in a rimited 
conflict. 
2.2.1.4 Conventional War 
In the past ten years, a shift in declaratory doctrine has occurred that has gIVen 
more prominence to conventional military options t han in t he decade preceeding 1977. In 
that year, General Secretary Brezhnev gave a major foreign policy address in t he Soviet 
city of Tula, in which he endorsed a change in previous doctrine regarding nuclear 
weapons. Brezhnev 
... declared that the Soviet Lnion rejected strategic superiority and merely 
sought to be the military "equal" of the United States. Nlore notably, he 
reversed two of the more enshrined axioms of Soviet military doctrine by 
disavowing any Soviet planning for preemption and claiming that no one could 
count on emerging from nuclear war the winner.21 
Though it has been argued that this 'shift' in doctrine merely represents a change m 
emphasis within a fairly continous strategy, 22 the effect of the 'Tula line ' has been to 
downgrade all nuclear options and to enhance conventional options for warfighting. 23 
The effort to match Western (especially U.S.) power in all fields of military 
competition has become one of the central tenets of Soviet military development. Writing 
one year after the enunciation of the 'Tula line,' Soviet historian Nicolai ~ikol 'skij, of the 
Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs , stressed that nuclear war was 
self-negating, and that the 'imperialist powers' had worked out an elaborate strategy for 
wagmg conventional war, t hus making it " ... necessary also to oppose to the imperialist 
powers a corresponding power on the part of peaceloving forces .... " 24 By 1982, Soviet 
military writings indicated that the basic option for warfare (though not t he only one ) 
had become the conventional one, and that the major threat to the Soviet Union was a 
'general conventional war' encompasing not only Europe but other theatres as well. 25 
Military figures as prominent as Ylarshal N. V. Ogarkov were asserting the possibilty no t 
only of all-conventional war , but also of prot racted conflict , even 'ex tending over man y 
years. ,26 American officials have acknowledged this shift in Soviet declaratory doctrine , 
yet also recognize that nuclear options have not been excluded from Soviet planning, by 
any means: the official perception is that" t he Soviets believe that a world war could be 
waged for a period of time with conventional weapons only .... the Soviets believe that it is 
possible that a conventional war will escalate to a nuclear conflict." 27 There has been a 
shift in Soviet strategy towards upgrading the conventional forces, t o n10re flexibly pursue 
military and political objectives and to more equally balance the forces of the ' imperialist ' 
West. 
The goals of Soviet conventional forces strategy echo those of overall military 
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strategy, and also include specific roles for conventional forces in peacetime. The primary 
o bjecti ves are deterrence and defense against con ven tional at tacks on the Soviet 
homeland, and, in the even t of a conflict with the U.S., :oJ Soviet leaders seek nothing less 
than a military victory .... " 28 To accomplish deterrence and warfigh ting goals, the means 
sought are forces sufficient to win a continental conflict as well as naval forces to control 
home waters and protect ballistic missile su bmarine bastions. 29 Besides these roles, 
conventional military forces are given the peacetime missions to maintain " ... an 
authoritative presence in buffer states ... help expand Soviet influence abroad; and 
discourage any ... venture against Soviet interests." 30 The varied roles defined for the 
military have enhanced the place of naval forces in Soviet strategy: as the missions of the 
military have expanded in both peacetime deterrence and warfighting contingencies, the 
Soviet Navy has expanded to better be able to fulfil some of these missions. 
2.2.2 The Navy in Soviet Strategy 
The missions of Soviet naval forces stem from the overall strategy of the Soviet 
Union. Particularly important in the development of the Soviet Navy and in the 
codification of its missions have been the strategic ideas of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956 until 1985, whose writings stress the 
" ... increasing importance of naval forces as an instrument of state policy in peacetime and 
as a means of influencing the course and outcome of wars of all kinds.,,31 Based on Soviet 
writings and pronouncements, as well as other evidence, there is a general agreement 
among analysts in the West as to the missions of the Soviet 01avy.32 The principle tasks 
of the Soviet Navy are strategic strikes, sea control, strategic defense and destruction of 
enemy naval forces, interdiction of sea lines of communication, power projection, and 
na val diplomacy / support of state policy. 
2.2.2.1 Strategic Strikes 
It is widely agreed that the primary mission of the Soviet 01avy is the execution of 
strategic strikes against land targets. Beginning in the mid 1960s, Soviet decisionmakers 
accorded this task to the Navy in an effort to increase the survivability of their nuclear 
weapon force and to ensure Soviet strategic might. The decision was accompanied by the 
development of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the deployment 
of " ... an array of surface vessels designed to provide a protective anti-submarine warfare 
screen."33 Subsequently, the strategic strike mission was refined, by adding SSBNs 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons against targets in the United States while stationed 
in Soviet home waters. Thus to the need for support forces was added the need for secure 
ocean bastions, defensible from attacks. 34 Currently , Soviet Delta and Typhoon class 
SSBNs are capable of reaching the U.S. with their submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
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(SLB~fs) from bastions in the Barents Sea and in t he Sea of Okhotsk; these two classes 
account for just over half the total Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet, but carryover 
60% of all Soviet SLB~Is and over 85% of SLB\tl warheads. 35 The remaining SSBNs, 
together with non-nuclear ballistic missile-firing submarines, are capable of shorter range 
strikes, either against the Eurasian landmass from Soviet home waters or against ~orth 
America from forward-deployed stations. 36 
The SSBN fleet is regarded as "the Soviet ~avy's primary threat to the United 
States .... " 37 However, the weight assigned to strategic strikes among all the missions of 
the Soviet Navy seems to have declined in recent years, concurrent with the shifting focus 
in overall Soviet strategy. It is clear that Soviet SSBNs are an important part of the 
Soviet strategic reserve, in line with a strategy of witholding SLBMs for purposes of 
retaliation and war termination leverage,38 but the role of the submarines has diminished 
in importance because of the reemerging emphasis on conventional operations and because 
other elements of the Soviet triad are now considered to be less vulnerable than 
previously thought. A new naval doctrine focusing on 'sustain ability , has emerged, and 
scenarios based on first-salvo nuclear engagement have been" ... replaced by others which 
put a premium on conventional options.,,39 In 1984, SLBMs carried a smaller percentage 
of total Soviet strategic nuclear warheads than they had ten years earlier (22.9%, 
compared with 26.7% in 1975).40 Two factors accounted for this: first, a more optimistic 
perception of the survivability of land-based ICBMs and the increased deployment of 
strategic bombers, including those armed with air-launched cruise missiles. 
According t o one analyst, 
by the 1970s, Soviet strategists had become far more sanguine than their 
American counterparts about the ability of their ICBMs to survive new missile 
accuracies (a decade later , three quarters of their strategic arsenal remained 
land-based, as opposed to less than one quarter of America 's ) .... The Soviets also 
believed that improved silo hardening techniques would permit a significant 
proportion of land-based missiles to survive attack, and be available for 
response. 41 
Likewise, the extreme weakness of U.S. air defenses and the declared intention of the 
Reagan Administration to deploy ballistic missile defenses have made the deployment of 
strategic bombers more attractive; in 1984, such forces totalled 11 % of total Soviet 
strategic weapons, compared with only 5.8 % in 1975.42 Changes in Soviet doctrine, 
combined with perceptions that other elements of the Soviet triad are incresingly capable 
of being made survivable , have resulted in some decrease in the emphasis upon the 
strategic strike mission of the Soviet Navy, though strategic strike seems to remain the 
Navy's primary mission. 
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2.2.2.2 Defensive Missions of the Soviet Navy 
Though the distinction between t he concepts of 'offensive' and 'defensive ' In 
weapons, force missions and doctrine is extremely controversial and often difficult to 
make, it is possible to differentiate among the other missions of the Soviet )ravy certain 
ones which are primarily defensive in nature. These are sea control, strategic defense, and 
destruction of enemy naval forces. Primarily offensive missions , the interdiction of sea 
lines of communication and power projection ashore, will be considered later. The three 
defensive missions often encompass complementary objectives in their execution. 
The mission of sea control is designed to assure Soviet ability to operate their own 
forces within a given area, usually the waters immediately adjacent to the homeland. 
Their main purpose is to protect their SSBN forces and to deny the use of the area of the 
strategic bastion to enemy forces (this aspect of the strategy is sometimes called 'sea 
denial' or 'area defense'). In the writings of Admiral Gorshkov, sea control is cited as a 
means by which the Navy can conduct operations which can be " ... decisive for the 
outcome of the war ," 43 and therefore is accorded high priority among the missions of the 
na val forces. The means for accomplishing control of the seas are essentially those that 
would entail the prosecution of strategic defense and the destruction of the enemy , 
namely, attacks against (in the case of a war with the United States and its allies) 
SSBNs, strike carriers, and other surface and subsurface naval elements. 
For the mission of strategic defense, the central goal would be " ... the destruction of 
those enemy forces that pose a nuclear threat to the Soviet Union .... " 44 The USSR could 
be expected, in the case of a general war, to use all of the forces at its disposal to 
accomplish this mission. This includes cruise-missile armed submarines, torpedo attack 
submarines, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ships and aircraft , and by ship-to-ship 
missiles and cruise missiles from surface ships. Naturally, these same forces would be 
employed in the destruction of enemy forces more generally, in the defense against any 
maritime attack. The ability of the Soviet Navy to carry out its strategic defense mission 
is questionable, however. Despite having spent considerable resources on the development 
of effective ASW forces,45 t he CSSR has found it difficult to track U.S. SSBNs. Because 
of this, and the considerable AS W capacity of the U.S. and its allies, the U.S. SSBN fleet 
is " ... currently believed invulnerable by U.S. (and probably Soviet) analysts. " 46 
However , improvements in Soviet surface ships, as well as extensive deployment of 
cruise missiles and more capable nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have 
enhanced the Soviet ability to attack and conceivably destroy strike carriers and other 
enemy naval forces. Notable among these improvements are t he deployment of Kirov 
battle cruisers, Udaloy and Sovremennyy class destroyers , and Alfa SSNs, all fitted with 
nuclear-tipped anti-ship and / or anti-submarine missiles, as well as conventionally armed 
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crUIse missiles and torpedoes. 47 These tactical nulcear weapons clearly provide a means 
of destroying an enemy navy , and raise the question of the Soviet doctrine for the use of 
nuclear weapons at sea. 
2.2.2.3 Naval Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
For a Navy which has for years been thought less capable than its U.S. 
counterpart, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons at sea provides a means for 
narrowing the gap in capabilities. For purposes of destroying enemy vessels, in a 
situation where multiple hits .with conventional weapons might be required to sink an 
aircraft carrier or other ship, " ... a single nuclear weapon, of even small size, would 
suffice." 48 Thus for the missions of strategic defense and destruction of enemy forces, as 
well as for the more offensive missions of sea-lane interdiction and power projection 
ashore, tactical 'nukes' provide a possible short-cut to success; their utility for carrying 
out defensive missions is evident, despite their tactically offensive nature. The 
increasingly large inventory of Soviet naval tactical nuclear weapons indicates " ... a 
continuing need to compensate for U.S. conventional superiority at sea.,,49 
Whether the Soviets would employ naval tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict, or 
at what stage, has been a matter of much uncertainty. Admiral Gorshkov, in The 
Seapower of the State, writes that" a special feature of the sea battle is that it has nearly 
always been waged to destroy the enemy. The equipping of the forces of the fleet with 
nuclear weapons is further accentuating this feature." 50 Analyses of Soviet military 
literature indicate that Soviet leaders have fewer inhibitions about the use of nuclear 
weapons than their American couterparts;51 besides, "Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear 
doctrines emphasize surprise offensive action as the best defense." 52 It is unlikely that 
naval tactical nuclear strategy' deviates much from other aspects of their nuclear strategy. 
For these reasons, and because of Soviet naval inferiority relative to the U.S., analysts 
have concluded that" " ... the Soviet navy must be expected to resort to the use of nuclear 
weapons at a fairly early stage of any major engagement at sea ... particularly if it is 
believed that the use of nuclear weapons could be confined to t he sea." 53 
However, there are a number of factors which suggest that the use of naval tactical 
nuclear weapons might not eventuate at an early stage in a conflict, or that it might not 
occur at all. First of all, is seems unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used at sea 
independently of their use on land. An avowed purpose of the Soviet Navy is to support 
land forces; "any naval tac nuke operation thus would likely complement strife ashore." 54 
Also, despite U.S. perceptions that "the Soviets are willing and able to use nulear and 
chemical weapons to insure sucess," 55 there is also a recognition of the changes in 
declaratory doctrine and operational force deployment which signal Soviet moves towards 
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enhanced con ven tional operations. In this decade, Soviet strategists have been 
~ ... addressing the possibility that a conventional conflict with the West could last for 
months .... Soviet combat forces (including the ~avy) are being configured to fight 
extended conventional conflicts ... ;" 56 
Finally, the argument that Soviet naval inferiority. makes a first-use of naval 
tactical nuclear weapons likely appears to have lost some of its force in the past five 
years, following rapid (and con tin uing) deploymen ts of Soviet vessels capable of effective 
con ven tional action. One analyst has cited a 1979 study which declares that "the 
dominant characteristics of many Soviet surface combatant ships ... all suggest that their 
employment in a long drawn-out conventional war was not forseen as a major mission 
when they were built."S7 However, many of the characteristics of vessels deployed since 
1980 suggest that they were built with the possibility of fighting a conventional war in 
mind. 
Soviet submarine forces are capable of carrying out conventional torpedo or cruise 
missile attacks against surface vessels (though in a conflict with the U.S. they would have 
a strong ASW force to contend with), and "the recent Soviet rate of development of new 
submarines and submarine related systems is remarkable: with seven new combat types 
and two research submarines being built since 1980 .... " 58 The Soviet Navy has some 63 
su bmarines capable of firing cruise missiles, together with between 200 and 214 attack 
submarines; the total of around 270 submarines is about three times as many as the U.S. 
deploys. 59 It is widely perceived that "compensatory U.S. quality is less notable 
annually, because [the Soviets] are replacing antiquated classes with sophisticated 
technology at a more rapid rate." 60 Among the submarines deployed primarily in this 
decade, the Oscar class, of which 3 vessels have been deployed, boasts the ability to 
launch 24 SS-NX-19 anti-ship cruise missiles and a double-hull construction to withstand 
conventional torpedoes. 61 In 1984, the USSR deployed two new classes of SSN, .\t!ike and 
51'eTTa, of which thus far only one example each exists, but which could provide increased 
capabilities should more be deployed; both of these submarines carry SS-NX-21 cruise 
missiles, with a range of 1600 nautical miles. 62 Both the SS-NX-19 and the SS-NX-21 can 
carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. There have been 20 V·ictOT III SSNs 
deployed since 1979, along with 11 K-ilo class SSs. Both classes have 8 torpedo tubes; 
though information is not readily available regarding the armaments of these submarines, 
it seems plausible that they carry both conventional and nuclear weapons, in line with the 
tendency of Soviet naval vessels towards dual-capability. The more modern SSNs and 
SSs, together with older Soviet submarines, r. are difficult to detect when running on 
batteries, and thus would be formidable for barrier operations in straits and other 
restricted waters." 63 
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Also since 1980, a third K ie'l1 class aircraft carrier, 2 nuclear-powered Kirov battl e 
cruisers, 1 SLava cruiser, 6 Sovremeflnyy and 7 Udaloy class destroyers have been 
deployed. 64 \Vhile not a large increase in numerical terms, these new deployments 
represent a significant qualitative improvement in Soviet surface combatants; most of the 
new ships are multipurpose, usually combining .-\S\V and anti-surface warfare capabilities. 
These ships " ... are larger, more heavily armed, and carry more munitions than 
predecessors. Those attributes better enable them to fight conventional wars.,,65 Yiost of 
the Soviet surface vessels are dual-capable, carrying both nuclear and conventional 
weapons; there is difficulty in determining what the exact balance of weapons types is 
aboard Soviet vessels, beyond recognizing that many of t heir antiship and ASW missiles 
can carry either type of warhead. Nevertheless, t here appears to be an effort in Soviet 
naval procurement to acquire surface ships and submarines capable of carrying out 
conventional battles. Based on the developments of the past ten years in particular, it 
has been argued that:") the armamen t of Soviet ships, submarines and aircraft moreover , 
certainly shows that they could give a very good account of t hemselves without going 
nuclear. ,, 66 The conclusions of the 1979 report regarding the conventional capabilities of 
t he Soviet Navy seem to be less accurate in light of shifts in doctrine and deployments 
since the end of the past decade. 
2.2.2.4 Offensive Mission s 
The expansion of Soviet naval capabilities has also embellished t he usefulness of the 
fleet for carrying out more offensive operations such as interdiction of sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) and power projection. The disruption of U.S. and allied SLOCs 
is a t raditional mission assigned to the Soviet ~avy. In the period in which Soviet 
doctrine assumed the rapid escalation of a conflict with the West into nuclear war, this 
mission diminished in priority, given that such a war would probably last for only a short 
t ime. 67 However, in recent years, the shifting focus of Soviet strategy towards a 
consideration of possibly protracted nuclear or co nventional war has returned SLOe 
interdiction to a place of greater prominence. Even as long ago as 1968 , SLOe 
interdict ion had been given a high priority: Marshal Sokolovskij's Soviet M 'ddary 
Strategy states that it is among the 'primary ' missions of t he Soviet Navy.68 Western 
analys ts generally agree that this mission is about third in priority for the Soviet Navy; 
but in the event of a protracted war the anti-SLOe mission would be very attractive for 
two reasons. First, a protracted NATO- Warsaw Pac t conflict would require t}1e Western 
allies to receive large numbers of supplies from the United States; the destruction of a 
por t ion of this military shipping" ... could be critical to t he outcome of the fight to the 
finish which t heir doctrine envisages.,,69 In the Pacific~ SLoes leading to Japan and 
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South Korea, which are impor tant to t hose nations ' economies , could be t hrea tened in a 
. conflict;iO however , SLoes do not appear to be as important to supporting a battle in 
t he Pacific t heatre as they are po ten t ially in Europe , in part because the vast expanses of 
t he Pacific at once make direct protec t ion of SLOes more difficult and the interdiction of 
t he SLOes less feasible. 71 Second , though not t he highest priority mission , SLOe 
in terdiction could assist some of t he more important missions by " ... t ying down \Vestern 
AS W forces and diverting them from posing a threat t o the SSBN strategic reserve. " 72 
Soviet capability to conduct anti-SLOe missions has improved with the general 
upgrading of t he fleet, and the U.S. Navy has concluded that t his increase in Soviet 
maritime strength, partcularly in its submarine forces , poses a significant threat t o 
Western sea lanes in the event of a conflict/3 Whether the Soviet Union would pursue 
such a mission or not would depend upon circumstances; but in the event of a protracted 
war, this mission could contribute to securing victory. 
The final major task of the Soviet Navy is the project ion of power ashore. This is 
one of t he lower-priority missions of the Soviet Navy, as indicated by the relatively small 
amount of resources allotted to it. Two main purposes for power projection capabilities 
can be identified: amphibious operations to secure strategic posi t ions and the support of 
ground forces. The latter is perceived as the more important.14 For t he mission of 
amphibious warfare , the Soviets deploy only a small Naval Infan t ry, amounting_to only 
about 16,000 active t roops in 1984 (compared with 155 ,000 U. S. Marines).75 This force 
has also suffered cutbacks in support ship procurement , with the postponement of 
construction of specialized assaul t ships after two Ivan Rogov class ships had been 
deployed in 1978 and 1983;76 in addition , the Soviet Naval infan t ry lacks the type of 
tac t ical aircover t hat t he U.S. amphibious forces can expect from carrier-based aircraft. 
For the support of ground forces , Soviet capabilities are somewhat greater , with more 
forces available for the tasks of " ... pro t ecting the army 's seaward flanks from attacks by 
enemy naval and amp.hibious forces , and providing naval gunfire and logistics support to 
land operations. " 77 However , t he main objectives of force project ion are likely t o remain 
areas of strategic interest that are relatively close to the Soviet Union , mainly for reasons 
of insuring t he presence of land-based aircover. 78 Presumably , t hese could include 
at tempts to seize the Danish and Turkish Straits, Nor t hern Norway , and t he Japanese 
Straits , all of which could provide strategically useful positions in a conflict . The 
capability of the Soviet Navy to project forces outside of areas where it can prov ide 
aircover appears small. 
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2.2.2.5 The Soviet Navy in Peacetime 
The main task of the Soviet ~ a Vy in peacetime is the support of state policy 
interests. These include protection of Soviet lives and property, extention of Soviet 
prestige, exten tion of Soviet influence, and countering th e expansion of 'i mperialist ' 
influence. 79 In particular, Soviet military writings (especially those of Admiral 
Gorshkov) lay an emphasis upon t he value of t he visibility of ships as a demonstration of 
power and , if necessary , of resolve. Gorshkov has writ t en t hat :-ldemonstrative actions by 
the fleet in many cases have made it possible to achieve poli ti cal ends without resorting 
to armed force .... t hus the f1eet has always been an instrument of t he policy of states, an 
important aid to diplomacy in peacetime. ~ 80 Because of t he possibility of world-wide 
deployment and mobility , naval forces are best suited to perform the task of 'showing the 
flag, ' and the increase in the number of foreign port visits between 1965 (when the ~avy 
visited 12 nations) and 1975 (when it visited 82 port s in 50 nations) serves to 
demonstrate the expansion of this Soviet naval mission. 81 In addition, t he Soviets have 
followed what \;fichael ~ccGwire calls a 'policy of incrementalism ' in expanding the role 
of t he f1eet in peacetime, exploring and exploiting opportunities to expand Soviet presence 
and influence. 82 Accordingly, the Soviets have not risked direct confrontation with U.S. 
forces, but have maintained naval presences and have sometimes used the Navy to 
provide support to allies and clients during conflict s. Soviet naval force support for the 
pursuit of policy objectives abroad, according to MccGwire, depends upon the" ... scale 
and style of the Western reponse to t he various Soviet initiatives.,,83 The recent 
deployments of impressive, high-technology surface vessels augment t he ability t o 
demonstrate Soviet power through port visits and off-shore presence, and to show support 
for Soviet allies and clients while countering t he presence of U.S. and allied navies. 
2.3 The Soviet Navy in the Pacific 
The Soviet Union has paid a great amount of at tent ion to the interests of its eastern 
regions in recent years. In July , 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev detailed a policy for 
Soviet relations in t he Pacific region, concentrating upon the desire of the Soviet Union 
for improving political and economic relations with regional nations, especially China and 
Japan. 84 Given in the Pacific port of Vladivostok, Gorbachev's speech reflected the 
increasing importance which the USSR places upon its position as an Asian and Pacific 
country, an importance which has also been signalled by a military build-up in the region. 
Soviet land, air, naval, and nuclear weapons forces have all increased in size and quality. 
In particular , t he Soviet Navy and forces assigned to naval aviation have grown in the 
past decade. The subsequent discussion describes the expansion of Soviet naval power in 
the Pacific and examines the buildup in light of the missions of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. 
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2.3.0.1 Naval Deployments 
The Soviet Pacific Fleet has been the fastest growing of the four Soviet fleets in th e 
past ten years, with increases in the numbers of surface and subsurface combatants as 
well as improvements in their quality and in the quality of their support facilities. The 
fleet has doubled in size since 1965, and in the past ten years has received a greater 
proportion of ships than other Soviet fleets: in 1965, the Pacific fleet accounted for 25% of 
all naval forces, while containing 28% in 1975 and 32% in 1986. 85 The Pacific Fleet 
attracts a disproportionate share of the more modern Soviet vessels; two of the three Kiev 
aircraft carriers, one of two Ivan Rogov amphibious attack ships, and Victor III and Kilo 
class attack submarines are among the most recent aquisitions. 86 In ~ovember 1985, a 
task force consisting of the Frunze, the second Kirov class battle cruiser, and one ship 
each of the Udaloy and Sovremennyy destroyer classes was transferred to the Pacific Fleet 
from the Northern and Baltic Fleets. 87 The Frunze carries 20 SS-N-19 cruise missiles, 
two air defense systems, and a point defense system, which enhance its attack capabilities 
and its survivability in a conflict; the Udaloy class destroyer carries eight SS-N-14 anti-
submarine missiles and a SA-N-8 anti-aircraft missile system, while the Sovremennyy 
class destroyer features eight SS-N-22 antiship missiles and SA-N-7 surface-to-air missiles , 
along with twin 130-millimetre guns. 88 In addition, bases in the Soviet Far East are 
home to about 40 \Taval Aviation Backfire bombers, armed with standoff missiles and 
capable of covering sea lanes as far as t he Philippines, Guam, and Midway without 
refueling. 89 These forces represen t t he state-of- the-art in the Soviet arsenal, and give the 
Soviet Union more naval power in the Pacific than ever before. 
Qualitative improvements in the entire range of vessels and aircraft assigned to the 
Pacific Fleet , in addition to absolute increases in numbers, provide t he USS R with the 
ability to carry out the missions assigned to it in the region , as well as to be prepared to 
execute missions that have lower priority in Soviet naval strategy, if required. Especially 
in t he areas of SLOC interdiction and power projection, the larger and more completely 
capable :\favy has developed useful attributes such as better naval avia tion and more 
potent surface and subsurface attack vessels. In addition, Soviet ship and aircraft 
deployment at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam have provided a means of increasing 
capabilities in these areas. Before considering the missions of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, it 
is useful to examine the basing of the fleet and of other Soviet military forces in the 
regIOn. 
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2.3.0.2 Soviet Facilities in the Pacific 
The Soviet )l"avy, the major source of potential t hreat t o the United States in t he 
Pacific , operates primarily out of bases in t he Sov iet Union, at Vladivostok (Fleet 
Headquarters), Sovetskaya Gavan , and Petropavlovsk , wi t h some naval and air forces 
sta t ioned in Vie tnam at Cam Ranh Bay. In addition , some 53 Soviet Red Army divisions 
I . 
are deployed in t he Far Eastern t heatre of military operat ions, or TVD (Teatr Yoennykh 
Deistvi,£).90 These forces are stationed mainly along t he GSS R's border with the People 's 
Republic of China; 91 however, 8,000-10,000 occupation forces stationed in the Kurile 
Islands north of t he Japanese island of Hokkaido constitute a strat egically relevant 
contingent. On these islands, which lie due east of t he Soya Strait, Soviet forces maintain 
i\1iG-23 fighter-bombers, together with early warning radars and antisubmarine warfare 
centres, designed to " ... help shield the Okhotsk sanctuary and Nlaritime Province." 92 
The Sea of Okhotsk is the main area in which the Soviets can deploy and defend SSBNs 
capable of strategic strikes against the United States, and the Kurile garrison, along with 
improvements in AS W capabilities and in SSN and SS technology would make an 
attempted assault upon the bastion quite difficult. 
The Soviet Pacific Fleet faces geographical difficul t ies in its home port deployments. 
The SSBN fleet is based at Petropavlovsk on t he Kamchatka Peninsula, which is t he only 
port with unimpeded access to the Pacific Ocean; yet access t o Petropavlovsk is 
constrained while t he sea is frozen for four months of t he year , t hough icebreakers can 
keep t he por t operating to some extent, and submarine operations are not severly 
ha~pered.93 The ports of Vladivostok and Sovetskaya Gavan are frozen for three to four 
months of the year , and surface ship movement is inhibited during the freeze , despite t he 
employment of icebreakers in both ports.94 Soviet ships operating out of Vladivostok and 
Sovetskaya Gavan also forced to pass through the Sea of Japan and one of t hree narrow 
straits overlooked by U.S. allies South Korea or Japan. In t he event of a conflict , the 
control of t hese st raits could become a crucial fac t or in t he waging of a successful 
campaign by either side. Also in t he event of a conflict, the USSR would have the option 
of dispersing its SSBNs in t he Pacific or, more probably, t o deploy them wi t hin the Sea of 
Okhotsk, an SSBN bastion more easily defensible by Soviet naval forces , mili tary forces 
based in the Kuriles, and ground-based aircraft. 
Because of the difficulties involved in t he use of Soviet home-water ports , effor t s 
have been made to secure facilities in warm water por ts for t he use of the Navy , especia lly 
to support the more offensive of Soviet wartime missions and to increase ped,ce~ime 
presence, leverage , and prestige. In 1979, t he Soviet s gained access to facili t ies m 
Vietnam, at Cam Ranh Bay, for both naval and air forces. The usual deploymen ts a t 
Cam Ranh Bay comprise " ... some 20 ships together wi t h six attack and cruise missile 
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submarines, some of t hem nuclear-powered , :operating] daily in t his area, an increase of 
25 percent since 1982.,,95 In addition , 8 Bear and 16 Badger aircraft provide 
reconnaisance and strike capabilities , and 1\1iG-23 fighter aircraft, together wi th SA..'vfs, 
ensure at least some capabili ty for defense of the base.96 
The presence of these naval units and aircraft overlooking the SLOCs t hat link U.S. 
East Asian allies with petroleum supplies from the Middle East, as well as being only 870 
nautical miles from the U.S. base at Subic Bay in t he Philippines, is a complicating factor 
for U.S. military planners. 97 However, though the facili t ies at "Cam Ranh Bay do provide 
a warm-water base for Pacific Fleet vessels that can contribute to SLOC interdiction and 
power project ion, t he base does not appear to be substantial enough to indicate that these 
missions have gained a greater priority in Soviet strategy in the region. That the bases 
are extremely important to the Soviets is evidenced by the amount of aid given to 
Vietnam since 1979 ($4.8 billion in military aid alone); 98 yet mainly transportable, rather 
than permanent facilities have been established , no Backf£re bombers have been deployed 
at Cam Ranh Bay to date , facilities for sustaining naval forces for long periods of time 
have not been developed, neither have facilities for extensive repairs , and the base at 
present is not capable of being defended against a concerted U.S. attack. 99 Thus, though 
the capabilities offered by a base at Cam Ranh Bay are attractive t o the Soviets, they do 
not seem to have been exploited in a manner which might indicate a serious intention of 
upgrading the missions of SLOC interdiction and power projection. The missions of 
Soviet forces at Cam Ranh Bay will be considered further in the following section. 
2.3.0.3 The Missions of the Pacific Fleet 
The tasks assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet are t hose which pertain to the Soviet 
~avy generally, among which the first priority is the securing of survival for SSBNs and 
the related missions of strategic defense, sea control, and sea denial. The missions of 
SLOC interdiction and power projection are secondary, though the former may be 
attractive in t he event of a protracted conflict , while the lat ter migh t be executed to gain 
con t rol of t he Japanese Straits to secure Soviet access to the open ocean. 
The establishment and defense of an SSBN bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk is widely 
regarded as the primary mission of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The recent naval buildup in 
t he Pacific has strengthened the Soviet ability to pursue this mission , through the 
deployment of more powerful anti-ship and ASW platforms; in addit ion, 
the geography of t he Okhotsk region is extremely favourable. Soviet land and 
air dominance over at least its inner reaches appers assured. The many narrow 
straits that constrain exit are ideal to defend agaainst entry. Some underwat er 
penetration might be possible , but shallow regions are particularly advan tageous 
to t he Soviet Navy's new diesel-electric submarines. Penetration by surface 
shi ps and carrier based aircraft is not likely. 100 
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The capabil t y of the Soviet \" a vy to achieve the miss ion of securing strategic strike forces 
must be judged to be qui t e good. 
The missions of sea control and sea denial: as well as that of destroying enemy 
forces, have been enhanced by recent naval deployments. Increasingly powerful surface 
ships and submarines make the task of securing areas for the exclusive use of the Soviet 
~avy easier; such areas in the Pacific would be the Sea of Okhotsk , t o provide the SSB~ 
bastion, t he Sea of Japan , and the Pacific Basin off the Kamchatka Peninsula. lOl For sea 
denial, t he ability to destroy enemy warships is vital; here , too, Soviet capabilities in the 
Pacific have been improved by the newer , more powerful forces. In particular , the newer 
cruisers feature cruise missiles with a range of 350 nautical miles and AS W weapons with 
a range of 30 nautical miles; the Sovremennyy and Udaloy destroyers provide the same 
ty pes of weapons (except an anti-ship range of only 60 n.m.), and all t hree of t he new 
vessel classes provide SAM missile defense systems with a range of at least 20 n.m. l 02 
The presence in t he Pacific Fleet 's Naval Aviation wing of 40 Backfire bombers also 
provides a greater ability t o ward off and destroy attacking forces. 103 The capacity of 
th e Soviet Navy for carrying out attacks on enemy forces in the Pacific has certainly been 
increased by recent deployments; however, it is difficult t o say with any certainty just 
how much stronger the Soviet Navy is in the region. Perhaps the most appropriate 
conclusion , in light of the increased Soviet attention to the contingency of protracted , 
potentially non-nuclear conflict, is that t he Soviet buildup reflects a desire to strengthen 
all aspects of its naval forces, and by doing so seek t o deter the occurence of war while 
bein'g prepared to fight it if war eventuates . The ability to attack enemy vessels at longer 
ranges, with cruise missiles and bombers, adds t o t he potential costs an adversary would 
encounter in launching an a ttack , and makes t he chance of securing t he objective of sea 
denial greater. 
Power projection and SLOC interdiction remain secondary m iss ions of the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet, despite t he additional capability which is afforded by the Soviet base at 
Cam Ranh Bay. It appears tha t th e Soviet presence in the Sou th China Sea pursues a 
number of objectives that are even lower on t he priority scale, but are nevertheless useful; 
these may be seen as mainly peacetime naval missions. The motives for Soviet naval 
deployment in Vietnam appear to be " ... to cover eventualities in case of war between the 
U.S. and t he "USS R, a war whose main focus would be in Europe; and to meet 
opportunities and t hreats arising in the Far East itself.~ 104 One of the major concerns of 
the Sovie ts in t he region is its rivalry with the People 's Republic of China, and the So-y-iet 
naval forces in Vietnam can serve t o deter or counter an y potential Chinese surface or 
su bmarine t hreat. As it is currently consituted, Cam Ranh Bay provides t he Soviets with 
the ability 
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t o constrain U.S . power projection in the area by presenting th e U.S. with th e 
possibility of a superpower confrontation ; to provide support to pro- Soviet 
communist insurgents should they become ac t ive in the region at some fu t ure 
date ; ... to facilitate rapid reaction between and in th e Indian Ocean and South 
Pacific; to use in any limited, regional conflict involving only local powers like 
t he PRC, Vietnam, and t he member states of ASEA~ , rather than in a general 
war in which t he U.S. has become directly involved. I 05 
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The value of Cam Ranh Bay to the Sovie t appears to lie in t he context of their 
overall expansion of capabili ties. The base provides the Soviets t he means of responding 
or t hreatening response to a regional conflict, and of deterring U.S. involvement in such 
conflicts; in addition, Cam Ranh Bay gives t he Soviets a better location from which to 
project political influence into the South East Asia region. Soviet presence in Vietnam 
has" ... conferred upon t he Kremlin a wide range of other geostrategic advantages useful to 
the attainment of state and ideological objectives." 106 The Soviet forces at Cam Ranh 
bay have " ... maintained a naval presence, performed reconnaissance and intellegence 
collection duties, and protected the Soviet airlift , sealift , and Vietnamese ports. " 107 Cam 
Ranh Bay facilitates the application of Soviet naval power in t he Indian Ocean , and 
provides a forward base for forces that could be used in SLOC in terdiction and power 
projection roles. Yet Soviet interest in these naval missions does not seem to have 
increased as the deployments in Vietnam have expanded; the relative lack of defenses and 
su pport capabilities reflect t he secondary nature of t he missions. Though Cam Ranh Bay 
provides t he Soviets with enhanced prospects for contemplating SLOC interdiction or 
power projec tion, it has not served to significantly raise t he value accorded to those 
missions in Soviet naval strategy, and the inadequacies of t he base facilities limit the 
scope of its t hreat to U.S. forces and interests in the region. 
2.4 Conclusions 
The past ten years have witnessed a sustained buildup of the Soviet naval forces, 
with significant increases in numbers of vessels deployed and in the quality of those 
vessels. No area has received more attention than the Pacific: the Soviet Pacific Fleet has 
benefit t ed from the addition of the newest and most capable ships in the Sovie t arsenal. 
This naval buildup can best be understood in the context of alterations in Soviet mili tary 
strategy during t he past decade , and in seeing that its basis lies" .. .in a determination to 
achieve parity with the Unit ed States in all aspec ts of power and influence." 108 Soviet 
military strategy seeks t o advance t he foreign policy goals of t he Soviet Union , including 
the deterrence of general war , the protect ion of the homeland and importan t allies , and 
the expansion of Soviet influence at the expense of its rivals. In seeking deterrence, the 
Soviets have assumed a 'warfigh ting ' posture: their doctrine holds victory to be the 
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ultimate goal of any conflict , nuclear or conventional, and Soviet strategy attempts to 
define the framework for achieving victory 1 ~hould deterrence break down. By 
maintaining an aggressive posture, t hey seek to enhance deterrence and to be able to 
prevail if deterrence fails. But a shift appears to have t aken place in t he Soviet 
consideration of the nature of a potential war: there has been more recognition since 1977 
of t he potential mutual devastation from a nuclear war, and an acceptance of the fact of 
mutual deterrence. Soviet strategists have focused increasingly on the possibility of a 
limited nuclear war (with the homelands of the superpowers as sanctuaries) or of a 
protracted conventional war with the West. These strategic developments have been 
reflected in t he buildup of forces across t he spectrum, in an effort to increase t he 
flexibility of response to various contingencies. 
In the area of naval forces, the buildup has been most spectacular. The Soviet Navy 
has developed from a coastal defense force into a highly capable ' blue-water ' navy, 
entrusted with a number of important missions within the overall Soviet military 
strategy. The primary naval mission remains that of securing a nuclear retaliatory force, 
in the form of SSBNs secured within ocean bastions and protected by surface and 
subsurface naval forces and bomber and fighter aircraft. ~ext in importance is the 
mission of sea control, or at least sea denial, designed to prevent enemy forces from being 
able to attack the SSBN forces or the Soviet homeland; the complementary mission is the 
destruction of enemy naval forces. In addition, t he Soviet Navy is assigned to interdict 
S LOCs that the U.S. or its allies would use for resupply , especially in a protracted 
conflict, and to project power ashore, in support of certain limited but strategically 
important objectives; these missions remain secondary to t hose of strategic st rike and sea 
control, despite recent shifts in doctrine. Finally 1 the Soviet 0ravy is employed In 
peacetime presence missions , to enhance Soviet prestige and to serve as a reminder of 
Soviet power and interests , and of Soviet support for its allies, surrogates, and clients. 
The capabili ty for carrying out all of these missions has been significantly improved by 
the deployments of the past decade. 
In the Pacific , the Soviet Navy has grown most quickly, and has caused a great deal 
of speculation regarding the intentions behind its qualitative improvement and the 
deployments of some force elements in Vietnam. For the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the 
pnmary mISSIOn is t he same as for the Navy generally: t o provide security for the SSBN 
fleet. The Sea of Okhotsk provides an ideal bastion for the SSBNs, and Soviet 
reinforcement of the Kurile Islands and improvements in surface and submarine AS Wand 
anti-surface warfare capabilities have greatly enhanced their ability to carry out this 
mission. In addition , the same improvements in capability have made the Soviet Navy 
more able to control t he areas around its home waters , and to contemplate more offensive 
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mISSIOns , including perhaps power projection to secure the exits for t heir ~avy onto the 
high seas. The base at Cam Ranh Bay has provided t he possibility of improving SLOC 
interdiction capabilities, but t he facilities at that base , while causing the U.S. and other 
regional nations some concern, have not been established or exploited in a way that would 
optimize their usefulness for this naval mission, leading to the conclusion that the an ti-
SLOe mission remains of secondary priority for t he Soviet Navy. The value of basing at 
Cam Ranh Bay seems to lie primarily in enhancing Soviet ability to maintain a presence 
in t he region and to project forces into the Indian Ocean. The significant improvement of 
the Soviet Fleet, coupled with a strategic doctrine which increasingly considers the 
possibility of protracted conventional war, indicates that t he Soviets will continue to 
pursue the goal of parity in all aspects of power with the U.S., to be better prepared for 
any contingency and to be prepared to exploit any opportunity for expanding Soviet 
influence. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The U.s. Maritime Strategy 
3.1 Introduction 
~ational security objectives and national mili tary strategy are in large measure 
responsible for the composition, deployment, and strategies of the various military forces 
at the disposal of the United States. While there has been substantial continuity in the 
definition of broad national security objectives since World War II, national military 
strategy and the associated strategies for force elements such as nuclear weapons and the 
Navy have undergone some alterations. Such changes have been highlighted in the 
attempts of the Reagan Administration to redefin'e parts of the national miltary strategy 
and to reconfigure U.S. military forces to suit the revised strategies , in t he context of an 
overall buildup of military strength. Salient among the innovations under the current 
Administration is the explicit declaration of a strategy for the U.S. ~avy , known as the 
:vraritime Strategy , which is designed to provide a framework for naval force 
development , deployment, and operations in the con t ext of t he overall national military 
st rategy. The ~laritime Strategy has been considered essen t ial by members of t he 
Administration , especially t he recently resigned Secret ary of t he Nav y, John Lehman , for 
the purpose of securing t he major objec t ives of national st rat egy , namel y det erring t he 
Soviet Union or fighting the USSR should deterrence fail , along with being able to achieve 
the goals of national policy in peacetime and in lower-level conflicts. This chapt er will 
first examine the shifts that have taken place in U.S. national mili tary stra tegy since the 
la te 1970s, and the concurrent evolu tion of u .s . naval st rat egy . T he elemen ts of the 
:'v1aritime St rategy and the rela ted missions of t he u .S. ~avy will be considered , with a 
par t icular emphasis on identifying the innovations brough t about by the recen t changes in 
strategy; and finally, t he relationship of the Marit ime Strategy t o U.S. naval forces and 
post ure in t he Pacific will be considered. The implica tions of t he new strat egy for 
capabilities , deterrence , stability , and the requirement s for U.S . defense commitmen ts in 
t he Pacific will be discussed in greater de tail in Chap ter 4. 
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3.2 The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy 
The Maritime Strategy which has been developed over the past six years has grown 
out of the strong naval tradition of the United States and from a trend in U.S. military 
thinking which assigns a larger, more complex role to the ~avy in overall military 
strategy than had been assigned to it in the 1970s. The framework of American military 
strategy has remained fairly consistent despite the advent of the · Reagan Administration: 
the objectives continue to be those which governed U.S. strategic planning in the previous 
decade, and the basic strategy continues to be deterrence, with collective security and 
forward defense still the vehicles for response if deterrence fails. However, the Reagan 
Administration has placed added emphasis on t. he importance of forward defense, and the 
\1aritime Strategy has been developed to enhance all three aspects of national military 
strategy through the employment of the U .S. ~avy. The role of the naval forces has been 
greatly upgraded, and their missions have been changed with respect to the situation in 
the 1970s. 
3.2.1 U.S. National Military Strategy in the 19109 
There are three main goals of U.S. national strategy. First , to maintain the 
security of the United States, second, to preserve the interests of allies and friends abroad, 
as well as vital U.S. interests abroad, and third, to help manage a global environment in 
which nations may coexist peacefully and the preservation and prosperity of American 
institutions could be better guaranteed.I°9 U.S. military strategy, intertwined with 
political and economic policies, has for a long time been the means for achieving these 
goals. In the 1970s, as in the entire post- World ,Var II era, the Soviet Union was 
identified as the major threat to U.S. security; the military strategy for coping with this 
threat centered on the principles of deterrence, collective security , and forward defense. 
This is clearly reflected in the statements of the Secretaries of Defense in this period~ who 
stress the need for enhancing deterrence, and for building" ... collective security on a firm 
foundation of conventional military power ," while maintaining the threat of escalation to 
nuclear weapons if con ven tional deterrence should fail. lID Forward defence is a key 
element of the strategy , with a stipulated requirement that U.S. and allied forward 
deployed forces " ... be sufficient in the first instance to hold a forward defense in such 
cri tical areas as Europe and Northeast Asia," for the purpose of assuring the territorial 
integrity of allies which are located on the 'front lines:' "politically, a forward defense is 
essential." III The military strategy relies upon both conventional and nuclear forces for 
its implementation; the roles of both types of forces in the overall strategy will be 
considered in the following sections. 
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3.2.1.1 Conventional Force Posture 
The decade of the 1970s saw a severe reduction in U.S. defense spending following 
t he American withdrawal from the conflict in Vietnam, coupled with a lessening of U.S . 
commi tmen ts to employ military force worldwide. American strategy con tin ued to 
depend on the its three traditional bases for security. But, in 1969, President :\fixon 
promulgated the 'Guam Doctrine; ' in anticipation of post- Vietnam war cuts in force 
levels, this doctrine'" ... placed upon U.S. Asian allies t he primary responsibility for their 
own defense , restricting the U.S. contribution largely to the provision of air and naval 
power and, where needed, logistical support. " 112 The following year , another 
retrenchment in U.S. military policy took place, which was again predicated on reduced 
U.S. force levels: the basis for U.S. force planning changed from a 'two-and-a-half-war 
strategy ' to a 'one-and-a-half-war strategy.' The former strategy was designed to "deal 
simultaneously with a major contingency in Europe, a major contingency in Asia, and one 
or more lesser contingencies elsewhere .... " The latter strategy sought to ,., deal 
simultaneously with one major contingency (wherever it might occur) and one mInor 
cotingency, with the capability to 'swing ' with some speed from one major t heater t o t he 
other." 113 Both the Ford and Carter Administrations which followed ~ixon used t he 
'one-and-a-half-war strategy ' as the basis for their conventional forces strategy , and also 
focused increasingly upon the single- theatre contingency of the defense of Western 
Europe. 114 
This extended to a perception that it would be " ... highly unlikely that the Soviets 
could (much less would) undertake simultaneously all the contingencies that must 
necessarily concern us, or that we would find it necessary to respond simultaneously to all 
of t hem. " 115 The retrenchment of U.S. military strategy in t his period is reflec t ed 
particularly in the decline of the U.S. ~avy within t he conventional force strategy , a t opic 
wh~ch will be examined more closely in a later section; naval forces have his torically been 
considered a primary means of carrying out a forcefu l global strategy , which was in some 
measure deemphasized in t he 1970s. 
3.2.1.2 Nuclear Force Posture 
U.S. nuclear forces strategy focuses on deterring the use of nuclear weapons by the 
Soviet Cnion , but does not preclude the use of nuclear weapons in t he event of an attack 
by the Soviets that cannot be contained with conventional forces. Two documents , 
President Nixon 's National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242 of 1974 and 
President Carter 's Presidential Directive (PD)-59 of 1980 define t he basic U.S. st rategy 
for t he employment of nuclear weapons in the context of the total mili tary strat egy. 
Both of these strategies attempted to come t o t erms with a perceived need for limi t ed 
'I 
I: 
'1 
"' 
1111 
ID 
Il' 
'1 
[I 
Iii 
pi 
I: 
Pi 
II 
" 
31 
nuclear options caused by the incredibility of nuclear weapons use in the face of essential 
parity between the U.S . and CSSR. Consequently, 
both based deterrence on war fighting abilities , as well as a balance of t error , 
and embraced Oexible response , which formerly per t ained almost entirely to 
conventional forces. The intent was to discourage all forms of nuclear 
aggression: by convincing Soviet leaders that escalation would be foolhardy and 
early termination advisable. U. S. abilities to respond across the complete 
conflict spectrum would cause them unacceptable costs, by any standards .... Both 
strategies assumed that nuclear war might be protracted, whether limited or 
not, a novel idea which previous sages never took seriously.116 
Deterrence of the Soviet Union by the threat of using nuclear weapons extended to any 
course of aggression the Soviets might contemplate. This strategic consideration was 
reflected in the Carter Administration's developement of more means for flexible nuclear 
response, including modernization of all three legs of the U.S. strategic triad and the 
combined NATO decision to modernize its Long-Range Tactical Nuclear Forces 
(LRTNF) .117 The essential task of U.S. nuclear forces was to deter Soviet aggression, 
and the Administrations of the 1970s began to perceive the ability to more credibly 
threaten the use of nuclear weapons at a variety of levels as the most effective deterrent. 
This concept of nuclear warfighting capability has been carried on by the Reagan 
A,dministration, which has added new forces to the U.S. nuclear arsenal for such purposes, 
as well as searching for means of enhancing conven tional deterrence. 
3.2.2 U.S. National Military Strategy in the 19808 
, The Reagan Administration has not changed the basic objectives of national policy 
nor of national military strategy; but what is significant about the defense doctrines of 
the 1980s is t he decision to again seek a more extensive form of deterrence, which plans 
for forces to be able to respond to a number of contingencies simultaneously, and the 
shifted emphases regarding the forces which are to carry out t he strategy. President 
Reagan and his advisors took office" ... committed to an across-the-board expansion and 
modernization of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces, to be financed by major sustained 
real annual increases in defense expenditure. " 118 The primary diversion from the 
preceeding administration in the elements of national military strategy lies in the move 
away from the 'one-and-a-half-war strategy' for force planning; the 1980s have witnessed 
a shift towards a strategy for dealing with" ... the demands of a worldwide war , including 
concurrent reinforcement of Europe , deployments to Southwest Asia and the Pacific , and 
support for other areas .... " 119 The primary beneficiaries of t his revamped strategy have 
been the conventional forces, particularly the U.S. ~avy , which is again seen as a primary 
vehicle for achieving the prescribed global strategy. )l" uclear forces have received 
considerable attention also, with t he continued commitment of the Reagan 
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Administration to t he modernization programs begun under President Car ter , and t he 
addition of air and sea-launched cruise missiles to t he nuc lear arsenal. 
3.2.2.1 Conventional Force Posture 
The main emphasis of the Reagan military buildup has been upon the improvement 
and expansion of U.S. conventional forces, coupled wi t h a redefinition of their missions 
wi thin the overall strategy. .'vfili tary strategy ' is still designed " ... to preserve U.S. and 
allied independence , integrity, and freedom, and our vital interests. We seek to achieve 
these objectives first without war, but if deterrence fails, by fighting to restore t he 
peace.:'J 120 Increased conventional capability has been sought both to enhance deterrence 
by increasing the survivability and credibility of conventional forces , thereby raising t he 
nuclear threshhold , and to improve the chances of achieving a peace on favourable terms, 
if fighting must be resorted to. After many years of concentrating upon the Soviet threat 
to Europe, and specifically the military forces arrayed along the front in Central Europe , 
the perception emerged that :'Jthe conventional forces of the United States must be 
designed for many different contingencies and to cope with a wide range of threats." 121 
From the perceived requirement of forces to meet 'many different contingencies ' has 
grown a supplementary push for forces capable of directing counterattacks in areas away 
from the original scene of conflict. The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy , Fred 
Charles Ikle', has asserted that 
we may be forced to cope with Soviet aggresion, or Soviet-backed aggression, 
on several fronts. But even if the enemy attacked in only one location, we might 
choose not to restrict ourselves to meeting aggression on the immediate front. 
Rather, we might decide to stretch our capabilities , t o engage the enemy in 
many places, or to concentrate U.S. forces and mili t ary assets in several of t he 
most critical arenas. 122 
This doctrine of 'horizontal escalation ' represented a clear departure from the 
strategy of the previous decade which sought deterrence and warfighting capability in the 
'swing ' of forces from the secondary theatres to t he primary theat re. The most obvious 
working out in practice of the strategic shift has been t he rebuilding of the U. S. Navy to a 
size judged capable of permitting the execution of t he strategy, which has been 
complemented by the development of the Maritime Strategy. This increase in the role of 
the Navy under the Reagan Administration, as compared with the 1970s , is described 
more thoroughly in a subsequent section. 
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3.2.2.2 Nuclear Force Posture 
Under the Reagan Administration , a significan t change has taken place in the 
consideration of likely contingencies of war. This A.dministration has emphasized non-
nuclear war, and protracted combat. 123 .-\ccordingly, the con ven tional forces of the U.S. 
have received primary attention in the military buildup. )levertheless, nuclear forces 
have been upgraded during the 1980s, particularly the cruise missile forces. The 
modernization of the strategic nuclear triad, begun under President Carter, has 
continued, with the fitting of new warheads on }vf'inuteman III ICBMs, deployment of 
the first .\1X ICBMs and Tn'dent SSBNs, the installation of air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALC~fs) aboard B-52 bombers, and the resurrection of the B-1 bomber program.1 24 
The deployment of G LCMs in Europe has proceeded, and Tomahawk tactical land-attack 
cruise missiles have been deployed on U.S. Navy battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and 
submarines; Tomahawks were first deployed in June 1984, and are capable of carrying 
either nuclear or conventional payloads. 125 
Yet the improvements in U.S . nuclear forces have not signalled a shift in U.S. 
nuclear policy, because the purposes of the nuclear forces remain essentially the same as 
in the 1970s. Four purposes are generally served by U.S. nuclear weapons today: first, 
deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States; second, deterrence of conventional 
attack against U.S. forces abroad and U.S. allies; third, to promote war-termination on 
terms favourable to the U.S., even if nuclear weapons have been employed; and fourth, to 
prevent Soviet nuclear blackmail of the U.S. or its allies. 126 The modernization of U.S. 
nuclear forces has been designed to further enhance the credibility and survivability of 
those forces, and by doing so to expand the spectrum of flexible responses and the 
potential warfighting capability. In this respect, the weapons procured and deployed 
since 1980 have been fitted into a nuclear strategy that was developed by the 
Administrations of the previous decade. Only in the area of strategic defense has the 
Reagan administration drastically departed from previous administrations , by seeking 
since 1983 to develop anti-ballistic missile systems. However , the research and 
development program initiated for the 'Star Wars ' systems has yet to produce any results 
that could cause a significant shift away from the current, long-standing nuclear forces 
strategy , and discussion of its potential implications are not within the scope of t his 
thesis. 
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3.2.3 Naval Forces in U.S. Military Strategy 
Naval power has been an important element of u.s. military strategy since the 
founding of the nation, and has played a key role in many of the conflicts in which the 
Vnited States has been engaged throughout its history. Consequently, forces have always 
existed in the u.s. which have advocated and pursued a primary role for the Navy in the 
total military strategy. In particular, the American naval philosopher Alfred T. :\Jahan , 
writing around the turn of the 20th century, believed :'l ... the efficient use of the sea to be 
the central and critical link in the chain of successes necessary to ensure national 
greatness.:'l127 The employment of the Navy in the Spanish-American War, and later in 
vVorld \Var II seemed to provide compelling evidence of the utility for national policy of 
the 'command of the seas.' In the period since World \Var II, the strength of the Navy 
has varied in accordance with the greater of lesser emphasis placed upon its necessity as 
an tool of national military policy. In the 1970s, naval power was relegated to a 
secondary position, taking a back seat to forces which appeared to more directly support 
U.S. military policy at its focus in Western Europe, and the decrease in the size of the 
Navy took place along with a decrease of its role in strategy. The advent of the Reagan 
Administration has witnessed a modernization and expansion of the Navy, as the primary 
means to carry out the revamped conventional military strategy. 
3.2.3.1 The Navy in the Late 19709 
Following U.S. withdrawal from the Vietnam War , military resources and the 
strategies to employ them declined in quantity and scope. Among the forces, the Navy 
bore a large share of the cutback, both through a reduction in forces and a decline in its 
strategic importance. Declining numbers of combatant ships in the early part of the 
decade forced the major reassessment of the Navy's missions. The number of combatants 
before 1970 was quite large: depending upon vessel classification, the maximum number 
reached was between 811 (in 1968), to 'well over a thousand. ,128 By the end of the 
1970s, the number of naval surface combatants had fallen t o less t han 500 , some sources 
placing the figure as low as 414 (in 1977) .129 This reduction was due primarily to t he 
fact that many of the Navy's ships had reached the end of t heir useful lives, having been 
built during or shortly after World War II.130 The smaller forces resulted in the 
reduction of possible missions for the Navy, and the redefinition of naval roles within the 
'one-and-a-half-war strategy. ' 
In the mid-1970s the missions of ~ he Navy were defined by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) as defending SLOCs, power projection , peacetime presence and 
contributing to nuclear deterrence through the SSBN fleet. 131 During this period, top 
priority was accorded in DoD declaratory strategy to the mission of securing SLOCs , 
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because of the concern in the U.S. military establishment over t he possibility of a \lATO 
war m Europe. This was especially true as t he decade approached its end, with the 
Carter Administration's focus on t he redressing the con ven tional balance in Europe 
drawing down t he role of the \lavy even further. By early 1978, Defense Secretary Brown 
was concerned with the potential vulnerability of t he U.S. aircraft carriers, and asserted 
that II ... th e ~avy ' s key function in the future will be to provide aircraft carrier protection 
fo r critical waterways, bases, and sea lanes." 132 At the same time, Brown sought to 
curtail the power projection mission of the Navy , placing limits on II ••• any naval role 
against the Soviet mainland, such as sending planes or landing troops, which the Navy 
had envisaged. ~ 133 The primacy of the mission of SLOe defense was carried over from 
the previous Administration, as was the definition of the means for carrying it out: 
'barrier' defense, or what is also described as 'defensive sea-control. ' Defense Secretary 
Schlesinger had indicated that these barriers would consist of first, "passive defenses, 
attack submarines, and patrol aircraft ," second, another barrier similar in composition to 
the first but strengthened by carrier-based aircraft , and third, "escort forces and the 
helicopters that accompany them." 134 
However , it is unclear how much t he Navy's operational strategy was in fact 
influenced by the declaratory strategy which was enunciated by the Carter 
Administration; it appears that the strategy preferred by officers in the Navy was quite 
different. It has been noted that even in the 1970s, the Navy was II • •• most interested in 
preserving and enhancing its conventional war-fighting capability against the Soviet 
Union, which included an emphasis on offensive sea control." 135 This concept of naval 
strategy was reflec t ed in the Navy's Sea Plan 2000 force planning study, which 
emphasized offensive missions against the Soviet Union in t he event of a conflict , 
according to the argument that" ... placing the Soviets on the defensive immediately is t he 
best way to dissuade them from launching attacks in the first place .... " 136 With regard 
to the Pacific Fleet 's strategy, one naval officer has pointed out that 
in all, American policies, doctrines, strategies , and wars have come and gone, 
and still the U.S. Seventh Fleet maintains essentially the same posture it 
assumed in the late 1940s. One concludes then, either that naval policies have 
been more enduring than specific premises of U .S. foreign policy, or that naval 
forces are not linked as directly to declared policies as is often assumed. 137 
But in the absence of a clear indication of U.S. operational strategy in the 1970s, it 
IS necessary to infer the possible focus of operational strategy from t he constraints 
imposed by declaratory strategy and from the statements of naval officers. Though t he 
~avy 's preferred strategy focused on offensive operations , the declaratory strategy of t he 
Carter Administration clearly down played these missions. The element of civilian control 
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that could be exercised by an _-\dminis tration guided by a more defensive strategy would 
have been bound to limit the extent to which the Navy could contemplate its preferred 
strategy in a crisis or a conflict. In addition, the perception of some naval officers is that 
the declaratory policy in fact reflected the ~avy's posture in t he late 1970s. For example , 
Vice Admiral James A. Lyons, the head of the U.S. Pacific Fleet , has stated that U.S. 
naval strategy in the 1980s " ... evolved from a strategy that was primarily point-defense-
oriented, to just protect convoys ... there really was no offensive side to the equation. 
You reacted to what the enemy chose to do." 138 Likewise~ Vice Admiral Henry 
C. YIustin has reflected that, in the 1980s, the ~avy has" ... broken the Procrustean mold 
of the ... 'convoy escort navy'-only syndrome .... Past practices narrowed the focus of naval 
alternatives and masked important contributions that the Navy can make to both 
deterence and warfighting." 139 In addition, the strategy elements of strikes against the 
Soviet homeland and possible attacks against Soviet SSBNs received little emphasis in the 
strategies of the 1970s , though they were not specifically deleted. 140 With no unclassified 
statement of U.S. operational strategy in the 1970s, the best that can be concluded is that 
the U.S. Navy's posture was in a state of uncertainty, with a declaratory strategy at odds 
with the Navy's preferred strategy, and that t he declaratory policy in practice would have 
restrained the missions of the Navy. 
By emphasizing the mission of sea-lane defense, and diminishing the power 
projection missions of the Navy, the Carter Administration sought to define a useful role 
for the 0ravy within the context of a smaller force and the focus of military strategy upon 
European contingencies. Despite a commitment within the declaratory strategy to 
" ... main tain a strong defense posture in the 'rVestern Pacific," U.S. strategy in the Carter 
years called for" ... the capability to deal with one major contingency at a time." 141 The 
continued reliance upon a 'swing ' strategy caused fears t hat the Carter Administration 
had lost " ... interest in maintaining a balance of power in northeast Asia and in the 
Pacific .... the naval cuts are cited as an example of this trend." 142 In short , the decrease 
in the size of the U.S. \iavy in t he 1970s was accompanied by a naval declaratory st rategy 
which limited the missions of t he Navy and emphasized defensive sea-lane control focused 
on the contingency of war in Europe. 
3.2.3.2 The Navy in the 19808 
President Reagan 's Administration has departed significantly from the prevIOUS 
several Administrations in its declaratory na'/al policies. There has been a shift of focus 
in the 1980s towards the possible need to meet a variety of contingencies simultaneously , 
if necessary; in t he context of the expansion of military strategy , t he role of flexible and 
mobile naval forces has been highlighted, and the missions of the Navy have been 
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expanded. ~o longer is t he focus primarily upon SLOC defense; rather , the ~avy in the 
1980s is expected to defend SLOCs in conjunction with forward attacks upen the Soviet 
forces and perhaps even homeland bases, as well as be prepared to project power into t he 
Third World. 143 The ~avy under Reagan is designed to be superior to the Soviet ~avy , 
with superiority enhanced by a more offensive warfighting strategy which aims at 
destroying the Soviet )Tavy.144 In many areas of the globe, the Navy is the main power 
projection force of the United States, and in this decade the purposes of power projection 
have been redefined: projection of power or its threat can enhance deterrence of the Soviet 
Lnion, as well as providing a means of meeting lower-level contingencies. Expansion of 
naval forces and abandonment of a 'swing ' strategy have also been designed to enhance 
deterrence, by placing the threat of horizontal, conventional escalation in the realm of t he 
possible and the credible. The focus on horizontal escaltion has enhanced the position of 
t he Pacific t heatre in naval declaratory strategy. 
3.3 The Elements of the Maritime Strategy 
The Maritime Strategy that has evolved under the Reagan Administration has as 
its main objective the determination of the role of the U.S. Navy in carrying out national 
military policy. As such, in the public pronouncements of high-ranking naval officials , it 
is said to embody " ... the professional consensus of the leadership of the Navy and the 
.\1.arine Corps on how to deter or , if necessary , fight, a future war." 145 Details of the 
strategy have been explicitly spelled out in the course of t estimony before the U.S. 
Congress, and also in the major naval journals, with a notable article by t he then-Chief of 
~aval Operations , Admiral James D. Watkins , entitled The .\laritime Strategy which 
appeared in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings in January 1986. Watkins ' 
statement of U.S. naval strategy represents an attempt to codify the missions of the Navy 
for peacetime operations, and its posture for war deterrence and warfightingj t he 
document concentrates upon the t asks of warfighting following a failure of deterrence. 
According to Watkins, 
t he Maritime Strategy is fully consistent with the national strategy documents 
and directives of this administration which emphasize the importance of 
maritime superiority to our national defense. It is a global strategy designed to 
meet a global and diverse t hreat , embracing all possible theaters of operations 
and their complex interrelationships , in peace, crisis , or war. It is a forward 
strategy, keeping with the national policy of forward defense and drawing on the 
forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility of naval forces. It emphasizes the 
importance of alliances and coalitions .... It emphasizes t he criticality of joint 
operations with our sister services .... It focuses primarily upon the central 
strategic issue of deterring , and if deterrence fails , figh ting a global war against 
the Soviet Union. It increasingly grapples with the issue of diversified violence 
in an era of violent peace , and considers how to provide deterrence accross the 
entire spectrum of possible conflicts. It presents a cohesive menu of global 
options for con trolling escalation, drawing on t. he flexi bili ty and range of 
capabilities inherent in naval forces , avoiding reliance on nuclear weapons , and 
recognIZIng the potential impacts of al tering the balance by con ven tional 
means. 146 
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Within t he context of the :\1aritime Strategy , four basic missions of the Navy can be 
identified: peacet ime presence, crisis response and direct military intervention in Third 
World conflicts , deterrence (nuclear and conven tional) , and warfighting. 
3.3.1 Peacetime Presence 
U.S. naval peacetime 'presence is designed to enhance deterrence and to further 
other national policy objectives. Naval forces are :'l ••• visible reminders of American power 
for all who see them during port calls or on television screens." 147 Through port visits 
and joint exercises with allied navies, the U.S. Navy serves to support allies and friends; 
t his serves to " ... provide a clear sign of U.S. interest in a given nation or region , and of 
U.S. commitment to protect its interests and its citizens." 148 Through a display of 
capability and commitment, these maneuvers help to deter war. The peacetime presence 
also permits naval forces to :'l ... promote diplomatic, economic, and other objectives of 
foreign policy not specifically military in character .... Port visits may support foreign 
policy objectives of promoting moderate and stable governments in unst able areas. ~ 149 
Though this role is routine, and often downplayed, it is a significant and important facet 
of naval strategy, not least because it is the most common mission in which the Navy is 
engaged, and because it is one that the Navy is well adapted to and good at performing. 
The fact that in 1985 the U.S. Navy participated in 86 combined exercises with 55 
countries and made port visits in 108 countries attests to t he scope of U.S . peacetime 
presence, and the capability with which this mission is performed. 
3.3.2 Crisis Response and Power Projection in the Third World 
The second major mission of the U.S. Navy involves the use of naval forces to 
respond to crises , and in particular to carry out direct military interven t ions in t he Third 
\Vorld for this purpose. Admiral Watkins has ci ted this mission as important because , "if 
a war with the Soviets ever comes, it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out 
of control. Our ability to contain and control crises is an important factor in our ability 
to prevent global conflict." 150 In addition , the United States has interests in the Third 
World which it has often employed force to protect , and t he Navy has played the major 
role in such activities: about 80% of the 250 cases of U.S. military force employment since 
World War II have featured naval forces. 151 VIarine Corps amphibious forces are 
designed for such missions where t he projection of armed t roops ashore is needed; t heir 
primary utility is in Third \\Torld areas , and in situations such as the assault on Grenada 
in 1983, rather than against well-prepared opponents such as t he Soviet Union. 152 Naval 
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forces are particularly useful for t he task of cnS1S response because they are forwa rd-
deployed, rapidly mobile , in a condition of high readiness, highly flexible in the type of 
force they can project and also in the manner of thei r presence. They are capable of 
performing a variety of missions, such as surveilance , threatening use of force, conducting 
gunfire bombardments or air strikes, establishing a blockade, or preventing intervention 
by other , perhaps hostile, forces. 153 This component of the .\Ifaritime Strategy establishes 
a means for the Navy to promote U.S. national interests and the strategic goal of 
deterrence in the Third vVorld and for managing crises in such areas t o ensure that they 
do not escalate to th reaten more vital U.S. interests or to involve the superpowers in a 
confron tation. 
3.3.3 Deterrence 
Given the hierarchy of national military objectives, the Navy's prImary mlSSlOn 
must be to deter the Soviet Union from committing aggression , nuclear or conventional, 
against a U.S. ally or in an area of vital U.S. interest. The missions of peacetime 
presence and crisis response indicate the role of the ~ avy in securing de terrence at low 
levels of violence , both vis-a-vis the USS R and in other contingencies not involving the 
Soviets; but deterrence of the Soviet Union takes on a particularly important role in the 
~laritime Strategy because of its focus on fighting a war if deterrence fails. The current 
Chief of N av al Operations, Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost , has stated that "the basis of 
deterrence is the creation of dou bt in the enemy's mind as t o what we would be capable of 
doing if he breaks the peace." 154 Therefore t he ~1ari time Strategy deals largely with 
constructing a framewo rk for fighting a war with t he Soviet union to lend credibility to 
the U.S. determination to fight if deterrence breaks down, thereby reinforcing a key 
element of deterrence, uncertainty. The concept of maintaining a warfighting capability 
and developing a strategy for waging war , in the interest of enhancing deterrence , is also 
one which drives Soviet military doctrine. The Navy provides means of enhancing . 
deterrence bo th through its nuclear delivery vehicles and by its conven tional forces. 
~ uclear forces are designed primarily for retaliatory missions , while t he conventional 
forces are designed to be able to fight a war with the Soviet Union should it break out. 
3.3.3.1 Nuclear Deterrence 
The Navy maintains a large inventory of nuclear forces which are intended to 
provide a survivable means of retaliation agains t t he USS R if it should make an attack 
upon the U.S. or its allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that "the fundamental 
objective of all U.S . nuclear forces is to remove all incentives fo r direct attack against the 
enited States or its allies by promising any a ttacker a devastating outcome." 155 The 
~avy relies mainly on SSBNs for its nuclear st rike capability, although Tomahawk cruise 
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missiles and carrier-based aircraft are also capable of delivering nuclear weapons agamst 
t argets eitller on land or at sea. 156 As of the beginning of 1985, SSBNs carried 592 
SLB~1s with 5344 warheads, which represented less t han one-third of u .s. strategic 
missile launchers, yet accounted for nearly half of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads. 1S7 
These nuclear forces provide an extremely survivable means of retaliation against the 
CSSR, due in part to the difficulty inherent in locating submarines in the open ocean (an 
area of pariticular Soviet weakness).1S8 Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are being 
installed aboard a number of u.S. surface ships and submarines, and represent another 
potential threat to Soviet forces; however , though u.s. doctrine acknowledges the need for 
a capablity to use nuclear weapons at sea, "U .S. )1avy strategists have never devo ted 
much time to tactical nuclear warfare." 1S9 This issue is dealt with in only a passing way 
by Admiral Watkins in "The Maritime Strategy," in a passage which indicates that 
Tomahawk platforms deployed around the periphery of the Soviet Union can improve 
U.S. nuclear posture and influence the 'correlation of nuclear forces,' upon which "the 
Soviets place great weight ... even during the time before nuclear weapons have been used. " 
vVatkins also sees the threat of tactical nuclear weapons use as a means of securing 
conventional war terminat ion on U.S. terms and of deterring escalation to nuclear 
weapons. The issue of when and how to use naval tactical nuclear weapons is not 
discussed. ~uclear forces in the u.s. ~avy , under current strategy , are designed primarily 
for retaliatory missions or for threatening direct attacks to deter the use of any nuclear 
weapons; there is little consideration of the policy for employment of naval tactical 
nuClear weapons or the defense against Soviet use of such weapons. 
3.3.3.2 Conventional Deterrence 
\lIost of the attention of the \I1aritime Strategy has been devoted to the issue of 
fighting a conventional war with the Soviet Union in the event that deterrence should fail. 
The issue is a complex one, and the strategy which the Navy has enunciated in the past 
few years has drawn considerable criticism for the warfigh t ing missions which have been 
set for t he forces. Some of t hese criticisms are considered in t he next chapter. In essence , 
a warfighting strategy is designed to reflect a warfighting capability and a determination 
to fight , which is designed to prevent a war from occuring at all. This is t he case with 
the \I1aritime Strategy 's concern with t he broad details of a conventional naval campaign 
against the USSR. The following section discusses t he main features of the warfighting 
strategy. 
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3.3.4 \Varfighting 
The need to be prepared to tight a global war wi th the Soviet e nion, should 
deterrence fail, has been the primary concern of t he ~avy in the developement of the 
Maritime Strategy in the 1980s. During this decade, a number of different offensive 
missions have been considered as pertaining to t he warfighting strategy, with a shifting 
emphasis among them in terms of priority. .-\s a result, " ... the \tlaritime Strategy is, in 
effect, an inclusive package of four offensive postures: direct naval impact, horizontal 
escalabon, offensive sea control, and counterforce coercion.,.160 The Maritime Strategy 
assumes that 
should war come, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground force 
advantage against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global 
conflict or with actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet strategy the 
United States must counter. The key to doing so is to ensure that they will 
have to face the prospect of prolonged global conflict. \tlaritime forces have a 
major role to play in this regard. The strategy setting forth their contribution 
consists of three phases: deterrence or the transition to war; seizing the 
initiative; and carrying the fight to the enemy.161 
Because emphasis on a warfighting strategy has returned to declaratory policy only in 
recent years, there is still considerable debate regarding the missions which the ~avy 
could and would undertake in a conflict. What is described in the next few paragraphs is 
the outline of the major elements of the Maritime Strategy as enunciated by Admiral 
Watkins, refered to by him as the 'professional consensus of the leadership of the Navy.' 
Again, however, it is difficult to be sure how far the declaratory strategy goes towards 
defining operational strategy in crises and conflicts. 
The first phase of a potential war is described as 'deterence or the t ransition to 
war ,' and focuses on the twin goals of attempting to main tain deterrence while mobilizing 
in preparation for the coming of war if peace cannot be maintained. In this phase , the 
U.S. would :l ... seek to win the crisis, to control escalation ... ," and by operations 
worldwide show resolve to fight. 162 The centerpiece of these operations would be forward 
deployment, which represents a key element of mili tary strategy even in peacetime. In 
the words of Admiral Watkins~ "the need for forward movement is obvious. This is where 
the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where we must be prepared to fight." 163 Forward 
movement of ASW forces will force the Soviets to retreat into their defensive bastions to 
protect t heir SSBNs, denying them the option of 'massive. early ' interdiction of allied 
SLOes. Two other factors influence the urgency of moving forward rapidly: 
early forward deployment of sea-based air power also is essential to support 
our allies, particularly Japan, Norway , and Turkey .... Forward deployment must 
be global as well as early. Deployments to the Western Pacific directly enhance 
deterrence, including deterrence of an attack in Europe, by providing a clear 
indication that 7 should war come 7 the Soviets will not be able to ignore any 
region of the globe. Should deterrence faiI 7 such deploy men ts tie down Sov iet 
forces 7 especially strike aircraft 7 limiting the Soviets' ability to concentrate their 
forces on Central Europe. 164 
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This statement presents the Soviets with the threat of direct military impact and 
horizontal escalation from the U.S. Navy: one naval officer has concluded that "the 
massive nature of the forward movement (indicating national will) and its global nature 
... are both designed to reinforce deterrence while being easily reversi bIe if deterrence 
prevails." 165 
The second phase of the warfighting strategy assumes that deterrence has failed; in 
this event, the U.S. Navy is called upon to 'seize the initiative.' In this phase, the 
missions of offensive sea control and coun terforce coercion could be first manifested. 
Seizure of initiative involves" ... the establishment of sea control in key maritime areas as 
far forward and as rapidly as possible. U.S. and allied AS W forces will wage an 
aggressIve campaIgn against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile 
submarines." 166 This aggressive surface and subsurface action contributes to alliance 
solidarity by demonstrating that the U.S. is prepared to fight in the vicinity of and in 
defense of even those allies which are on the exposed flanks of NATO and those in Asia 
which are close to the USSR. This would prevent any chance of Soviet action against 
SLOCs by forcing them to concentrate upon defense in or close to their home waters, and 
to draw their focus away from the land battle on the Central European front, to " ... dilute 
their effort, divert their attention, and force them to divide their forces." 167 The mission 
of attacking submarines appears to be designed primarily to destroy Soviet attack 
submarines or force the major part of the SSN/ SS fleet to defend SSBNs in home 
bastions, preventing them not only from attacking allied shipping, but also from 
attacking allied surface warships and especially aircraft carriers. This phase of a war 
would also feature a goal of countering Soviet air threats to U.S. and allied ships by 
means of a layered antiair warfare approach; the threat from Soviet land-based naval . 
aviation bombers is considered the main threat to the fleet during this phase. 168 
The final phase of a war, 'carrying the fight to the enemy,' involves continued 
prosecution of counterforce coercion while completing the destruction of the Soviet fleet 
(begun in the second phase) and threatening attacks from the sea against Soviet 
homeland naval bases; the goal in this phase again is to seek war termination on 
favourable terms. By destroying the Soviet Navy, it becomes possible to threaten direct 
attacks upon the Soviet homeland; by attacking Soviet SSBNs~ the U .S. ~ avy would seek 
to reduce" ... the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance III 
our favor.,,169 Through the direct threat to the homeland and by the prevention of 
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escalation to nuclear weapons because of t he unfavourable correlation of force, "maritime 
forces thus provide strong pressure for war termination that can come from nowhere 
else." 170 The mission of 'coun terforce coercion,' which in practice means the destruction 
of Soviet SSBNs, is the element of the \ 'Iaritime Strategy which has perhaps caused the 
most controversy. The implications of this mission will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the next chapter. 
It is worth noting two points before moving to a discussion of the Maritime 
Strategy in the Pacific. First, the Nlaritime Strategy as currently defined contains 
elements that are of recent addition and upon which there is in fact a lack of consensus 
within the Navy; and second, the strategy is designed to be flexible in its employment. 
John Mearscheimer describes clearly the evolution of the .vIaritime Strategy under the 
Reagan Administration from a focus primarily upon offensive sea-control and horizontal 
escalation to a more complex strategy encompassing these missions as well as direct 
military impact and counterforce coercion, the last of which he describes as the 
'centerpiece' and 'principle goal' of the Maritime Strategy.171 Yet he conceeds that the 
)l"avy did not explicitly define counterforce coercion as part of the Maritime Strategy in 
public statements until the appearance of Admiral Watkins' article in January 1986, and 
neglects the opposition to this element of the Strategy from within the Navy itself.172 
Mearscheimer himself notes that" ... there are almost certainly important disagreements 
about strategy among the different constituencies in the Navy." 173 
This leads to a second point, that the Maritime Strategy is flexible, as well as being 
mutable: Admiral Trost points this out when he states that 
... the strategy is flexible, as strategies always must be to be effective. It is not 
a game plan ... .If deterrence fails, what our actions would be at the time is a 
matter for the commanders involved to determine at that tt"me .... Right now, we 
can't say what our exact response would be to a Soviet attack. It would depend 
on where, when, and how big it was, and who was involved .... Let them worry 
about what we are capable of doing, and let us not give them any easy 
assurances ahead of time. The Nlaritime Strategy reserves the employment of 
forces to the absolutely indispensable element of the evaluative process. 174 
Faced with these considerations, it is hard to be sure how faithfully the Navy's 
declaratory strategy translates into operational policy. Because there continues to be 
debate within the Navy over the details of the strategy, for example, certainty that the 
element of pro-SSBN attacks would actually be pursued is impossible; as Admiral 
Watkins has written, "the strategy does not envision automatic attacks on any specific 
targets .... " 175 Even if such attacks are part of operational strategy, concerns about their 
ramifications in light of particular circumstances could result in it a decision not to 
implement this part of the strategy. Again, conclusions are constrained by a lack of 
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material regarding naval operational policy. It does seem, however, that the emphasis in 
declaratory strategy on offensive operations, reflected in t he Maritime Strategy , 
represen ts a departure from many of the elemen ts which apparently guided naval 
planning in the 1970s. 
3.4 The Maritime Strategy in the Pacific 
The Pacific Ocean is an area of great interest to the United States, for geographical , 
historical , and economic reasons. The U.S. is a Pacific nation by virtue of its long 
coastline on t he ocean and t he control, in or on the Pacific , of the States of Alaska and 
Hawaii. as well as Yfidway Island , Guam , and the Northern Yfariana Islands , all of which 
are remote from t he 'continental' United States. The U.S. Navy has had an interest in 
the Pacific that dates back to the early years of nationhood, and it has a proud history of 
success in the Pacific theatre: in 1898 , a naval force completely destroyed the Spanish 
fleet in Manila harbour to help secure t he conquest of the Philippines, and in World War 
II , the )lavy 's victories in the Coral Sea, at Midway, and in th e Philippines Sea helped t o 
pave the way for the defeat of Japan. The long-time connection with the Pacific has left 
a legacy within the Navy , which" ... continues to hold a certain interest and fascination 
with the Pacific region and its experiences there which directly translates into central 
fac tors for defining and determining naval priorities and maritime strategies that have 
also been applied to other geographic regions. " 176 
U.S. concerns in the Pacific have proliferated since World War II. U.S. economIC 
interest in the Pacific has grown considerably in t he past few decades, and" ... since 1980 
the Pacific Rim has superseded Western Europe as America 's most impor tant overseas 
trading part ner. " 177 The United States maintains a number of security agreements with 
Pacific region nations , including Japan , South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and New 
Zealand , which commit it t o respond in some way to attacks upon any of these nations. 
U.S . interests in t he Pacific have always been strong , and have developed even more in 
recent years , especiall y because of the increased importance of the region to the U.S. 
economically, and because of the increasing Soviet interest and military deployments in 
the Pacific. Since the U.S. ~avy constitutes t he primary source of U.S . military power in 
the region, its strategy in par t icular has paid more attention to the perceived need to 
protect U.S. Pacific interests. The Yfaritime Strategy developed in the 1980s contains a 
number of elements that reflec t U.S. concerns about Pacific security . 
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3.4.1 The Inlportance of the Pacific 
\Vi t h the advent of the 1980s and t he codification of t he yfaritime Strategy: t he 
Pacific has assumed a position of import ance in the strategic pos t ure of t he U.S. :"Javy , 
both because of t he requirements for protecting U.S. interests in t he region and for 
purposes of deterring t he Soviet Union within t he context of overall mili t ary strategy. 
John Lehman has pointed out the fact that American interests in t he Pacific are now 
:vital,' and thus deserving of attention comparable to that devoted to Europe; In 
describing and defending the abandonment of the 'swing ' strategy, he has noted that 
clearly, our increasing commercial interest and historic security ties in t he 
Pacific impact on our naval planning for t he area. If we are to protect our vital 
interests, we must have forces available to deploy--not only to t he Atlantic 
t heaters and the Sixth and Second fleets--but also to the Pacific simultaneously, 
to the Seventh and Third Fleets and the Middle East Force of the Central 
Command. We cannot abandon one theater in order to deal with the other. 
The great paradox of the 1970s was the reduction of the fleet's size so it could 
only be employed in a 'swing strategy '--just as that strategy was being rendered 
obsolete by trade, geopolitics, and the growth of t he Soviet Navy.178 
The importance of defending U.S. interests in the Pacific is also closely tied to the 
strategic goal of deterring Soviet aggression: "secure deterrence requires that the United 
St ates and our allies maintain a balance of conventional forces able to meet and fight for 
a sustained period against a conventional Soviet attack in Western Europe, Northeast 
Asia, and Southwest Asia." 179 Pacific missions of the Navy have increased in value for 
t he strategic purposes of maintaining commitments to allies , securing deterrence, and 
pro't ec t ing U .S. interests; but the Pacific has also figured in t he development of the 
warfighting doctrines described by t he Maritime Strategy. 
U.S. naval forces in the Pacific have for a long t ime been assigned t he miSSlOn of 
forward deployment in support of 'front-line ' allies , namely Japan and South Korea; 
under t he Maritime Strategy, however , they might be expected to wage a major conflict 
with t he Soviet Navy at the same t ime as a war was being fought in Europe. President 
Carter's Administration had defined the Pacific as a thea tre of secondary priority, yet an 
A.dminis t ration spokesman also stated publicly that "it is our policy , nonetheless, to 
maintain a strong defense posture in the Western Pacific , not only as a demonstration of 
our interest and presence in the region , but also because we would want to deter any 
reckless actions in Northeast Asia .... " 180 The U.S . naval presence in t he Western Pacific 
has not changed significantly in numerical t erms since the days of the Carter 
Administration;181 however , important qualitative improvements have occurred in the 
Pacific Fleet. All but one of t he Pacific Fleet 's aircraft carriers now carries F-14 
interceptors armed with Pheonix air- to-air missiles , and in addi tion , 
F / A-18 Hornets were deployed aboard the CSS Constellation in February 
1985. P-3 Orion ASW support has expanded and improved. Three nuclear-
powered cruisers bolstered battle groups in 1984. ~ew frigates and destroyers 
now dominate the escort mix, the total is larger by 10, and almost all mount 
Harpoon missiles. One battleship bearing land-attack Tomahawks already is 
assigned; a second is expected. The attack submarine count rose from 37 to 44, 
including 11 Los Angeles class. 182 
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Though there has not been an increase iOn forward deployed forces in the Pacific, the 
overall number of vessels potentially available, and the quality of the vessels, has 
increased. 
In line with the apparent shift towards more aggressive missions for the U.S. ~avy 
as a whole (at least in the declaratory strategy, and seemingly at the operational level as 
well), the missions of the Pacific Fleet have changed somewhat. In the 1970s, the 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Maurice F. Weisner predicted that in a 
conflict with the Soviet Union, " ... one would forsee primarily a struggle for control of the 
vital lines of communication (LOCs) throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean 
regions." 183 The Maritime Strategy anticipates aggressive, offensive action by the Pacific 
Fleet at the same time as U.S. and allied Navies in the Atlantic are attacking Soviet 
naval forces in the ~orwegian Sea and even in their home waters off the Kola Peninsula. 
This declared mission for the Pacific forces is designed to serve first as an additional 
deterrent against Soviet aggression, and second, in the event of a war, as a means of 
" ... employing the ~avy as a strategic instrument to counter-balance and restrain Soviet 
military power in the Pacific and keep it from being brought to bear in Europe and the 
Atlantic .... ~ 184 As a result of the Pacific campaign in vVorld War II, the Navy has 
perceived the need to be seen as capable of operating in high-risk areas t o ensure 
credibility; the ability to threaten attacks close to the Soviet shores is also intended to 
keep elements of the Soviet fleet occupied in homeland defense and away from missions 
more threatening to Western forces , as well as to enhance the deterrent posture to 
prevent conflict. 185 The Maritime Strategy's role for the Navy in the Pacific is t rue to 
t hese aims. 
3.4.2 U.S. Forces and Missions in the Pacific 
The missions of the U.S. Seventh and Third Fleets in the Pacific are to maintain a 
deterrent presence and forward-deployed posture in peacetime, to be prepared to project 
force in support of U.S. interests in the region, to maintain a nuclear retaliatory force 
(with SSBNs), and to be prepared to fight a convent ional war with the Soviet Union 
should deterrence fail. In t he context of the Maritime Strategy, it is t his last mission t hat 
has changed the most. The Navy:s two Pacific fleets contain nearly half of the U.S. 
principal surface combatants, including six aircraft carriers , two battleships , and 18 
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cruisers. 186 In addition , 42 SSNs and SSs are assigned to t he Pacific , along with seven of 
the 36 U.S. SSBNs. Of these forces , about one-quarter are forward-deployed: the Seventh 
Fleet, assigned to the Western Pacific, is comprised of 23 surface combatants, including 
two carriers, 15 SSNs and SSs, and six amphibious vessels. 187 The headquarters of the 
Seventh Fleet is located at the naval base in Yokosuka, Japan; other bases of the Seventh 
Fleet are located at Subic Bay , Philippines, Guam, and Nlidway. The Second Fleet , in 
the Eastern Pacific, retains the balance of U.S. Pacific forces, except for detachments 
from both fleets assigned periodically to the Indian Ocean and based at Diego Garcia. 188 
U.S. Pacific forces are forward based to help deter the Soviets and to assist our 
allies in the event of a conflict; in the event of a war, the Maritime Strategy envisions 
t heir reinforcement from the Second Fleet and their agressive attack against Soviet forces. 
According to the Secretary of the Navy, "in wartime, we would deploy five carrier battle 
groups to the Seventh Fleet, two battleship action groups, and four underway 
replenishment groups. rd89 Two of the Seventh Fleet 's carrier battle groups would meet 
U.S. commitments in the Southwest Asian region, while the Third Fleet would retain two 
carrier battle groups for the defense of the mid-Pacific , the Eastern Pacific, and the seas 
surrounding Alaska. 190 In light of U.S. perceptions of Soviet naval strategy, U.S. forces 
in the Pacific would be called upon to fight a war in or near t he Sea of Japan , and 
perhaps off the coast of the USSR near the base at Petropavlovsk. As indicated above , 
t he Ylaritime Strategy calls for 'forward operations,' to prevent Soviet forces from leaking 
out of their bastions into areas where they could threaten allied SLOCs; in the Pacific 
theatre, this translates into sorties against Soviet forces in the entrances/ exits of the Sea 
of Japan as well as against the bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Kamchatka 
Peninsula. This marks an apparent departure from previous declaratory strategy , which 
stressed barrier operations and convoy protection to protect SLOCs. Because of the 
qualitative advancements in t he Soviet Navy in recent years , and t he strenthening of the 
fo rces in t he Kurile Islands , it is generally concluded that U.S . forces would find it 
'hazardous to pene trate ' the Soviet bastions in a war. 191 
Nonetheless, t he mission assigned to the U.S. Pacific naval forces is to be prepared 
" ... t o sink the enemy 's navy. ~ 192 By implication, this would involve direct attacks upon 
the Soviet fleet elements, including possibly SSBNs, in their home waters. If the decision 
were t aken to attempt them, such attacks would be designed t o keep Soviet naval forces 
bottled up in the bastions, to threaten at t acks upon the Soviet homeland, and if possible 
to destroy some of the Soviet SSBNs in an effort to secure war-terminat ion leverage. The 
implications of these and other aspects of t he .\IIari time Strategy, and the particular 
effects on t he Pacific theatre, are discussed in t he next chapter. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
United States military power has experienced a major buildup in the 19805. The 
u.s. ~avy in particular has benefitted from a commitment on the part of the Reagan 
Administration to increased defense spending, which at least in the early years of the 
decade received broad public and Congressional support. Objectives of national policy 
and national military strategy have remained consistent with those of earlier 
Administrations: the bases of U.S. military strategy remain deterrence, forward defense, 
and alliance solidarity. However, elements of the military strategy have been altered, 
along with the forces designed to carry out the strategy. This is again most evident in 
the development of the Navy's Y1aritime Strategy, in which emphasis has been placed on 
the ability to fight a war if deterrence should fail. The importance of forward defense has 
been stressed, both for ensuring the ability to defend allies close to the USSR and to 
improve the U.S. deterrent posture. The Reagan Administration has also developed a 
more global outlook for military strategy: unlike the Carter Administration, which based 
its strategic outlook on the 'one-and-a-half-war strategy,' the current Administration has 
sought stronger and more balanced capabilities to be able to respond to a number of 
contingencies simultaneously. From the days of the Nixon Administration, U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy was predicated upon the need for a credible, flexible capability for 
warfighting to secure deterrence; the Reagan Administration has expanded this concept to 
include conventional warfighting strategies. 
Among the aspects of the 1980s military buildup, the large increase in the size and 
missions of the U.S. ~avy stands out. By the late 1970s, the ~avy had shrunk to fewer 
than 500 surface combatants, and its role in declared military strategy had shrunk, as 
more emphasis was placed upon defensive tasks and less on offensive, aggressive missions. 
At least to some extent, operational policy followed suit, and the Navy's preferred policy , 
which emphasized offensive operations, was constrained. Also, the focus upon potential 
superpower conflict in Europe required the Navy to 'swing' from the Pacific to the 
Atlantic in the event of such conflict, and the force structure and strategy did not permit 
attention to more than one major contingency at a time. In the 1980s, the naval forces 
have sought to reestablish 'superiority' over their Soviet counterparts, and a 600-ship 
Navy has been developed to permit the Navy to wage conflicts simultaneously in two (or 
more) separate theatres. The Nlaritime Strategy that has been enunciated in this decade 
stresses the need to define a strategy for fighting a war, as an additional means of 
deterring the Soviet Union. This has added a fairly complece framework for waging war 
to the naval missions of peacetime presence, crisis response , and power projection which 
have also served to protect U.S. interests. However, the details of the strategy are still 
the subject of debate, both within and outside the ~avy. Offensive missions, absent for 
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th e most part from declaratory st rategy in th e 1970s , have bee n stressed ~ and there seems 
to be more focus upon these missions in operational t erms as well. The Reagan 
Administration 's concern fo r developing a capability to respond to multiple contingencies 
has been a major fac t or driving th e enlargement of t he Navy and t he re tu rn t o 
prominence of its offensive missions. 
The Pacific region has gained importance for the U.S. in the 1980s, with an 
expanSIOn in t rade and significant Soviet deployments supplementing previous historical 
and strategic interests in the region. Declaratory strategy in this decade has reflec ted the 
increased importance of t he Pacific for t he U.S. by reaffirming U.S. commitments in the 
region, but moreover by abandoning the swing strategy which characterized naval policy 
in t he 1970s. The Pacific Fleet is now expected to operate independently in support of 
U.S. interests in the Pacific, including perhaps conducting attacks against the Soviet 
Fleet in conjunction with operations in other theatres under t he doctrine of horizontal 
escalation. The value which t he U.S . sees in the Pacific is clear from t he fact that almost 
half of the entire Navy is based in t his ocean , and that significant modernization has 
t aken place in t he Pacific Fleets; the forward strategy which has been developed in 
declaratory policy reflects this importance, with its emph asis upon enhancing both 
deterrence and t he ability to protect U. S. allies through the capability and determination 
t o carry out forward operations in the Pacific simultaneously with operations elsewhere. 
Tr 
I~ 
I 
50 
Notes 
109. Weinberger, Ope cit., p. 27. Weinberger declares that ~ ... the basic goals of our 
national securiLY policy remain essentially unchanged since t he late 1940s ... ;" that the 
goals of national sec uri ty policy in the 1970s were essentially the same, see Brown ~ 
Harold, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget , FY 
1983 Author'ization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 3-5, hereafter cited as Brown, FY 1982 
Budget Report. 
110. Brown, Harold , Department of Defense Annual Report , Fiscal Year 1979 
(Washington, D.C.: C.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 79, hereafter cited as 
Brown, FY 1979 Budget Report; see also pp. 79-87, and Schlesinger, James R., Report of 
the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Trans'ition Budgets, FY 
1977 Authorization Request and FY 1976-1980 Defense Programs (Washington, D.C.: 
U .S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. III-6 to III-13. 
Ill. Brown, FY 1979 Budget Report, p. 82. 
112. Record, Jeffrey , Rev'ising U.S. ]vJ£litary Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
Pergamon Brassey 's International Defense Publishers , 1984), p. 7. 
113. Schlesinger , Ope cit., pp. III-9 and III-10. 
114. Record, Revising U.S. M'il£tary Strategy, p. 32. 
115. Brown, FY 1979 Budget Report, p. 80. 
116. Collins, Ope cit., p. ,56. 
117. Brown, FY 1982 Budget Report , pp. 5-6. 
118. Record , Rev'ising U.S. iVfil£tary Strategy, p. 39. 
119. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, cited in Record , Rev'ising U.S. 
}v'fil£ tary Strategy, p. 42. 
120. Weinberger , Ope cit. , p. 33. 
121. Ikle ', Fred Charles, "The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on the Strategic 
Imperatives ," Strateg2'c Re'l)2'ew, Vol. 1 0, ~o. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 14. 
122. Ibid. , p. 15. 
123. Friedman, ~orman , "US \I1aritime Strategy,;' International Defense Review, 
Vol. 18 , ~o. 7 (July 1985 ), p. 1072. 
..... 
51 
124. Collins, op. cit.. pp. 57-58; see also The .\lilitary Balance for the various years 
of this decade. 
125. Collins, op. cit .. p. 81. 
126. Ikle" op. cit., p. 17. 
127. Lehman, John F., Jr., ~Rebirth of a U.S. )laval strategy,:') Strateg'':c Rev'iew, 
Vol. 9 , No.3 (Summer 1981), p. 11. 
128. The first figure is cited in Record, Rev'':s ing U.S. jv!1.'litary Strategy, Appendix 
D, p. 102, and is based on information provided to the author by the Department of the 
)lavYi the second figure is provided by Friedman in op. cit., p. 1073. 
129. Record, op. cit., p. 102. 
130. Weinland, Robert G., The U.S. lVavy in the Pacift.'c: Past, Present, and 
Chmpses of the Future , Professional Paper No. 264 (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for 
Naval Analysis, Institute of Naval Studies, 1979) , pp. 8-10. 
131. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. III-20. 
132. Weinraub, Bernard, "Brown Seeks to Cut ~avy's Role in )lonnuclear War ,'" 
The lVew York Times, January 27, 1978, p. A8. 
133. Ibid. 
134. Schlesinger , op. cit., p. III-25. 
135. Williams, John A., "'U.S. Navy Missions and Force Structure: A Critical 
Reappraisal," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 7, No.4 (S ummer 1981), p. 506. 
136. Ibid. 
137. McGruther, op. cit., p. 32. 
138. quoted in Gordon, Michael R., "Lehman's )lavy Riding High, But Critics 
Question Its Strategy and Rapid Growth," !.Vat~'onal Journal, Vol. 17 (September 21, 
1985), p. 2123. 
139. Mustin, Vice Admiral Henry C., "Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates," 
United States ~aval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 112, ~o. 9 ,(September 1986) , p. 36. 
14:0. Gordon, op. cit., p. 2123. 
141. Brown, FY 1979 Budget Report, pp. 91,90. 
142. Burt, Richard , "U.S. Defense Debate Arises Over Whether Focus on Europe 
Neglects Other Areas," The New York Times , March 24 , 1978, p. 3. 
143. Friedman, op. cit., p. 1074. 
144. Record, Rev'ising U.S. A1ilitary Strategy , p. 43. 
145. Brooks~ Linton F., "~aval Power and National Security," International 
Security, Vol. 11, No.2 (Fall 1986) , p. 59. 
1-16. Watkins, op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
147. Williams, "The U.S.and Soviet Navies: Nlissions and Forces," p. 509. 
,52 
148. Watkins, op. cit .. p. 8. 
149. U.S. Congress , Senate Appropria tions Committee, Hearings on the 
Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 126., hereafter cited as SAC Hearings on FY 87 
Defense Budget. 
150. Watkins , op. cit.~ p. 8. 
151. Ibid. 
152. Williams, " The U.S. and Soviet Navies: \lIissions and Forces ," p. 515. 
153. Watkins , op. cit. , p. 8. 
154. Trost , Carlisle A.H., "Looking Beyond the ,'vlaritime Strategy ," United States 
,)[aval Institute Proceed£ngs, Vol. 113, No.1 (January 1987) , p. 16. 
155. United States M 'ilitary Posture for FY 1987, p. 8. 
156. Williams, "The U.S. and Soviet Navies: Missions and Forces ," p. 511. 
157. Collins, op. cit., pp. 174, 177, 180. 
158. Understanding Soviet Naval Developments , p. 31. 
159. Collins, op. cit., p. 83. 
160. NIearscheimer, John J., "A Strategic \lfisstep , Internat£onal Securdy, Vol. 11 , 
No.2 (Fall 1986), p. 17. 
161. Watkins , op. cit. , p. 8. 
162. Ibid. , p. 9. 
163. Ibid. 
164. Ibid. , p. 10. 
165. Brooks, op. cit., p. 65. 
166. Ibid. 
167. Watkins, op. cit. , p. 11. 
168. Ibid., p. 12. 
169. Ibid., p. 13. 
170. Ibid., p. 14. 
171. \lIearscheimer , "A Strategic iYfisstep," pp. 19-25. 
172. Mearscheimer cites a number of documents which show that some naval 
comentators considered the pro-SSBN mission before it was included as a feature of 
Watkins ' " The ~ari time Strategy" (see ,'vlearscheimer , "A Strategic Misstep ," p. 22n); 
however, t here was opposition to t hese ar ticles : par t icularly t o David B. Rivkin "~o 
Bastion for the Bear ," United States ~aval Institute Proceedin gs , Vol. 110: No.4 (April 
1984) , pp. 36-43. See, for example the letters in "Comment and Discussion ," 
Proceed'ings, Vol. 110, ~o. 6 (June 1984) from Commander Fredrick J. Glaeser. USN, and 
Captain W.J. Ruhe , USN (re t ired ), and in "Commmen t and Discussion ," Proceed£ngs, 
53 
Vol. 110, )io. 7 (July 1984) from Captain Robert H. Smith, CS\T (retired ), which are 
severely crit ical of t he Rivkin essay. 
173. Mearscheimer , "A Strategic \1isstep," p. 18. 
174. Trost, op. cit., p. 16. 
175. Watkins, op. cit., p. 12. 
176. Ullman, Harlan K., "The Pacific and US )iaval Policy," ~Vaval Forces , Vol. 6, 
No.6 (1985), p. 36. 
177. Smolowe, Jill, "Pacific Overtures," Time Austral£a, Vol. 1, No. 18 (November 
17, 1986) , p. 58. 
178. U.S. Congress, SAC Hean:ngs on FY 87 Defense Budget , pp. 78-79. 
179. Weinberger, op. cit., p. 34. 
180. Brown, FY 1979 Budget Report, p. 91. 
181. Ibid.; compare The M£litary Balance 1986-1987, p. 29. 
182. Collins, op. cit., p. 142. 
183. Weisner , Admiral \1aurice F., "The U.S. Posture in Asia and the Pacific: The 
View From CINCPAC," Strateg£c Rev£ew, Vol. 6, No.3 (Summer 1978), p. 45. 
184. Ullman, op. cit., p. 41. 
185. Ibid., p. 40. 
186. The M£litary Balance 1986-1987, p. 28. 
187. Ibid., p. 29. 
188. Ibid. 
189. U.S. Congress, SAC Hearings on FY 87 Defense Budget, p. 79. 
190. Ibid. 
191. Collins , op. cit., p. 141. 
192. Foley , Admiral S.R. , Jr., ~ Strategic Factors in t he Pacific ," U ni ted States 
Naval Institute Proceed£ngs , Vol. 111 , No.8 (August 1985), p. 35. 
CHAPTER 4 
Implications of the Maritime Strategy 
4.1 Introduction 
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With the enunciation of the Maritime Strategy, and the concurrent expansion of the 
U .s. ~avy, there have been criticisms of various aspects of the strategy, especially 
regarding operations in the Pacific. This chapter will analyse the arguments of a number 
of critics, among them John Mearscheimer, Jeffrey Record, and others cited below. Some 
critics have raised questions concerning the ability of the Navy to carry out the missions 
assigned to it by the Maritime Strategy. First, it is asserted that the Navy is incapable of 
executing the large number of missions assigned to it, despite the buildup to nearly 600 
ships; the obligations of the U.S. are disproportionate to the level of forces it possesses. 
Second, the ability of the Navy to carry out specific missions set by the Maritime 
Strategy has been questioned, with particular concern for the vulnerability of aircraft 
carriers and su bmarines in the face of Soviet counterattacks, if the U.S. chose to attack 
Soviet naval forces, including SSBNs, close to their homeland. In addition to the issue of 
capability, these arguments call into question the credibility of U.S. threats to attack the 
Soviet Navy within the framework of the Maritime Strategy. 
Other criticisms question the usefulness of the Navy's offensive sea control strategy 
and the value of the Maritime Strategy for deterrence. Critics claim that an offensive 
doctrine is unnecessary for ensuring the protection of Atlantic and Pacific SLOCs. Others 
claim that the )lavy 's assertion of the importance of the Pacific , and its strategy's threat 
of simultaneous naval conflict in the Far East and well as in Europe should deterrence 
fail, in fact contributes nothing to deterrence, specifically to the deterrence of conflict in 
Europe. The deterrent value of the Maritime Strategy hinges upon the credibility of the 
threats which it presents and whether it can increase doubts regarding the outcome of 
aggression and the potential cost of a conflict , thereby reducing the likelihood of a conflict 
erupting. With regard to operations in the Pacific, it is argued that the doctrine of 
'horizontal escalation ' draws u.S. resources away from the most vital area, Europe, wl:lle 
failing to tie down comparable Soviet resources and failing also to cause a shift in forces 
away from the Central Front in Europe. In addition, the argument considers it unlikely 
that the Soviets would be concerned with attacks against their 'periphery, ' being content 
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In a war to win t he battle for Europe and to subsequent ly deal with t he t hreats to t heir 
Far Eastern territory. 
One of the features of t he Ylaritime Strategy of which some analysts have been 
particularly critical is the aspect which involves aggressive attacks against the Soviet fleet 
in its home waters, against its bases, and potentially against Soviet SSBNs. Critics 
contend that aggressive, forward operations are provocative, and could lead to Soviet 
preemption in a crisis or first-use of nuclear weapons at sea in a conflict in which Soviet 
forces were being defeated, or in which Soviet naval strategic assets were being destroyed. 
This concern is relevant in the Pacific theatre, due to t he element of horizontal escalation 
in the Maritime Strategy which predicts operations in t he ~orth Pacific to secure leverage 
over the Soviets; critics contend that by forward operations in the Pacific, U.S. forces 
make the use of nuclear weapons more likely. 
A final argument that has been made concerning U.S. offensive force posture in the 
Pacific is that it threatens to embroil other regional nations, especially Japan , in a war in 
which they have no interest and from which they could expect serious repercussions in the 
form of direct attacks against their territories. In t his chapter ~ these criticisms of the 
~aritime Strategy will be analysed, with the goal of assessing the capability of the Navy 
to carry out its strategy, the value of the strategy for deterrence, the threat to escalation 
generated by the Maritime Strategy, and the effect of the strategy on Japan, the main 
U.S. ally in East Asia. Attempts will be made to consider each of the criticized aspects in 
t he context of the strategy as a whole, and to consider the relevance of each criticism to 
naval operations in the Pacific. 
4.2 Capabilities 
Arguments that the U.S. Navy is not capable of carrying out the missions defined 
for it by the Maritime Strategy arise from perceptions that the ~avy is spread too thin to 
accomplish its tasks , or that t he Soviet forces opposing it in a given t heatre are too great 
to permit t he U.S. to succeed in its missions , or both. The implicit crit icism becomes one 
regarding credibility; if the U.S. Navy threatens t o carry out at tacks of which it is not 
capable, then the deterrent value of such threats is severely diminished. This section 
attempts to assess the credibility of the warfighting posture enunciated in the Maritime 
Strategy. 
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4.2.1 Insufficient Means for the Declared Ends 
A major focus of criticism of U.S. military :; trategy generally in recent years is that 
t he commitments and responsibilities of t he enited States require a much larger outlay of 
military resources t o meet them t han is appropriated. ~filitary analyst Jeffrey Record 
has argued that miIi tary strategy, and naval strategy in particular, fall far short of the 
point at which there is a rough equivalence of ends and means. He has stated that 
"whatever may be said about the declared goals of the strategy , the stark reality is that 
t he U.S. does not posess, nor will it in the future, conventional forces sufficient to fulfill 
those goals." 193 Record supports his view by citing t he" ... huge disparity between extant 
and projected conventional force levels, on the one hand, and those believed by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (J CS) to be necessary to provide reasonable assurance of fulfilling the 
objectives of the 'worldwide war' strategy on the other." According to the JCS , for 
example, the Navy would require 24 carrier battle groups in 1989, rather than the 
planned 15.194 The report of the JCS on U.S. Military Posture reflects t he divergence of 
needs and means by declaring that" US forces are not available to defend simultaneously 
against every threat with equal strength." 195 
Yet the assertion of a gap between forces available and forces desired for a 
' reasonable assurance ' of success does not in and of itself answer the question of whether 
or not the United States is capable of carrying out its strategy with t he forces it currently 
possesses. Despite t he admitted inability to meet all contingencies with equal forces , the 
U.S. military is still charged mainly with the task of protecting U.S. vital interests. 
These have remained essentially the same over the past 15 years, codified militarily by 
alliance agreements with nations in Europe, the Pacific region, and elsewhere, and 
economically defined by t he areas of major trade, Western Europe, the Persian Gulf 
region, and the Pacific Rim. The gap between defense resources and commitments has 
existed for some time; for example, despite the focus of t he Carter Administration on the 
defense of Europe, it repeatedly stressed U.S. vital in te rests in the Pacific and particularly 
in t he Middle East. The Carter Doctrine, which declared U.S. intentions t o use any 
means available, including force, to prevent control of the Persian Gulf region by an 
outside force, was an exemplary case of the failure to meet ends with appropriate 
means. 196 What has been accomplished by the Reagan Administration has been t o , at 
least in some measure , " ... bring U.S. military power into closer alignment with U.S. 
military commitments abroad .... " 197 Despite a gap between available and desired forces , 
it might still be possible for the U.s. to achieve the goals of its strategy. 
The essential purpose of U.S. military strategy, and consequently of the Maritime 
Strategy, is to deter conflict. In the context of meeting U.S. military commitments, the 
Maritime Strategy at tempts to define missions which achieve lower-level objectives while 
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erectm g a framework for fighting a war with the Soviet Cnion if deterrence fails . . The 
available forces may not reflect the ideal or recommended level for ensuring t he 
achievement of strategic goals; nevertheless, the st rategic goals are inescapably defined by 
U.S. vital interests. Current U.S. force levels may not assure success in a war; yet t he 
successful U.S. military strategy is above all one w hereby deterrence is preserved. 
Deterrence, the central goal, can be main tained even if the U.S. cannot be certain of 
victory in a war; what is required is a credible threat to wage a war , and a credible 
possibility that the war objectives might be met. What is required for deterrence is not 
t he assurance of being able to prevail , but rather t he perception by the enemy that he 
cannot prevail. A strategy which enhances t he enemy's doubts regarding his chances in a 
war and which raises the costs of going to war enhances deterrence. This is the declared 
purpose of the Maritime Strategy; to what extent the Navy's strategy can achieve this 
will be considered in a later section. 
4.2.2 Credibility 
Two elements of the Navy 's Maritime Strategy have been criticized for lacking 
capabili ty, and therefore credibility. First, the idea of fo rward offensive attacks 
employing aircraft carriers is seen as potentially catastrophic, because of t he vulnerability 
of t he carriers, and unlikely therefore to achieve success. Likewise, Navy's mission to 
attack Soviet SSBNs has been labelled as not viable by analysts such as Mearscheimer 
and Tom Stefanick. Should the U .S. ~avy be perceived by the Soviet Union as incapable 
of ~arrying out its strategy, deterrence of opportunistic Soviet initiatives could be 
weakened. Yet the arguments about U.S. naval incapacity are not altogether convincing: 
t here is evidence which suggests that the U.S . Navy is in fact capable, or is at least 
perceived as being capable of carrying out even the missions detailed by the Maritime 
Strategy. 
It is argued t hat forward offensive at tacks by carrier battle groups are" ... a recipe 
for the certain disablement or destruc t ion of the very carrier battle groups for which 
~ Lehman l has long and effectively lobbied. To venture U.S . carrier battle groups close 
enough to the Soviet Union to launch air strikes on the Soviet Navy's home por ts is to 
venture into the jaws of defeat." 198 Admiral Stansfield Turner and Captain George 
Thibault have described the threats which a carrier battle group would have to face when 
sailing to attack Soviet homeland bases. According to t hem, surprise could not be 
maintained, and therefore Soviet forces could be put on alert; when t he U.S . forces were 
within 1,600 miles of Soviet air bases , t hey would be within range of over 90 percent of 
Soviet bombers , and still 1,000 miles from where t heir own carrier aircraft would be in 
range of Soviet bases. Thus " ... the carrier force would be subject to Soviet air 
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bombardment for nearly two days before it was close enough to strike Soviet bases.:"! 199 
U.S. carrier battle groups would also be under attacK from submarines and surface ships 
wi th long-range missiles before reaching the point where its aircraft could at tack Soviet 
bases or fleet elements still in their home waters; having arrived in the zone where they 
could carry out attacks, U.S. ships are particularly vulnerable. According to Turner and 
Thibault, 1') ••• the chance of losing part, if not all of ~ the carrier task force ] would be high 
simply because the trends of technology give the attacker who employs the new stand-off 
weapons like Exocet a considerable advantage today. 1') 200 
The pessimistic analyses of U.S. carrier capabilities for forward attack fail to 
consider the advantages which the U.S. ~avy possesses in technology and particularly in 
alliances. Both of these factors would significantly enhance the U.S. ability to carry out 
forward attacks against the Soviet Union. The Soviets cannot be certain of their ability 
to defend against U.S. forces at the range described by the Turner and Thibault: not only 
carrier-based aircraft, but land-based U.S. and allied aircraft would be available to 
intercept Soviet bombers sent to attack the U.S. fleets. Even the most advanced Soviet 
fighter aircraft could only escort the bombers for about 800 nautical miles; Soviet 
Backf£re bombers would have to approach to within 300 n.m. of the U.S. fleet to fire its 
AS-4 air-to-surface missiles, well within the combat radius of all U.S. carrier based 
aircraft. Lacking guns and air-to-air missiles, the chances of a Backf£re against U.S. 
fighter aircraft cannot be termed good. 201 In addition, the most direct routes from Soviet 
bases to an attacking U.S. fleet would pass through the airspace of U.S. allies in most 
cases (except in the case of bombers sent against a U.S. force in the Pacific north of Japan 
and south of the Aleutian Islands), providing the possibility for early warning and 
response by carrier-based aircraft or by interceptors based in allied countries. U.S. Air 
Force aircraft, such as the 36 F-4 and 48 F-16 fighters based in Korea and the 72 F-1S 
fighters based at Okinawa, Japan, together with allied air forces, could contribute to 
intercepting Soviet naval aviation, and also contribute to operations in the Sea of Japan 
and its accesses. 202 A squadron of 27 F-16 fighters has recently been deployed at Misawa 
Air Base in northern Japan, enhancing available U.S. airpower in the northern area of the 
Sea of Japan and also providing forces for possible operations against Soviet forces in the 
Okhotsk bastion. 203 
Technological innovations appear to favour U.S. Navy's chances of success in 
attack. Far from revealing the value to the attacker of missiles such as the Exocet, the 
Falklands War of 1982 proved the value of concerted and highly capable air defenses for 
naval forces; British forces caused dreadful attrition to Argentine air forces, shooting 
down over 90 planes. The principle elements of the fleet, the aircraft carriers, were 
capably protected from missiles by the use of countermeasures. 204 In this regard, the 
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u .S. ~ a vy possesses significant capabili ty to cond uct anti-air , anti-surface and anti-
submarine warfare. 205 .-\mong the forces available to the ~avy to fight off Soviet attacks 
prior to launching their own are frigates, destroyers and cruisers carrying Standard anti-
aircraft missiles (capable of handling three contacts at once) , and the Ticonderoga class 
cruisers which feature the AEGIS air defense system, making them" ... the best air-defense 
ships in the navy-and, almost certainly, in any navy. ,,206 There are 16 AEGIS cruisers 
built or funded, meaning at least one for each carrier battle group. U.S. aircraft carriers 
are capable of projecting fighter and attack aircraft against Soviet targets from positions 
defended by their defensive air, surface, and su bsurface forces, and even from behind the 
land barrier of Japan in the case of attacks against the Soviet Far East. With the 
available, highly capable defense systems, and favourable geographical and alliance 
support, the credibility of the contemplated U.S. attacks is assured, at least to the extent 
that the Soviet ability to ward off such attacks is uncertain in areas beyond its immediate 
home waters. 
The capability for t hreatening attacks against Soviet SSBNs is more . questionable; 
as discussed in the previous chapter, it is also a mission that, though described as a 
feature of current U.S. naval strategy, might not be executed during a conflict. While it 
is generally agreed that" ... there is no doubt that American submarines have a qualitative 
edge over their Soviet counterparts," 207 the numerical and geographic advantages lie with 
the Soviet Union in the defense of their SSBNs. First, U.S. SSNs are the vessels most 
likely to be employed to try and sink Soviet SSBNs, at least until (and if) U.S. control of 
the ' seas in the Soviet SSBN bastions is secured, which would involve a vigorous battle 
regardless of the outcome; Soviet attack submarines hold a significant quantitative 
advantage in both the Atlantic and t he Pacific. Should the U.S. choose to execute an 
all-out pro-SSBN mission, approximately 30 U.S. SSNs would be available to attack as 
many of the over 40 Soviet SSBNs in the Atlantic as had put to sea, which would be 
defended by nearly 130 Soviet SSNs and SSs.208 In a conflict, Soviet SSBNs attached to 
the Northern Fleet would probably head for t he Arctic Ocean , where thei r chance of 
detection is smaller, leaving their SSNs and SSs to face attacking U.S. SSNs. 209 In the 
Pacific, about 40 U.S. SSNs would face a greater challenge: besides over 90 Soviet attack 
su bmarines, the approaches to the bastion in the Sea of Okhostk are more easily 
defensible. 210 Soviet forces, based on land, are present at all entrances into the bastion, 
in addition to surface and air ASW forces. The entrances to the Sea of Okhostk are also 
easily mined to prevent access by hostile forces. 
Despite the Navy's present declaratory doctrine , even statements by suppor t ers of 
the ~faritime Strategy have implied a conservative evaluation of the U.S. capability to 
succesfully attack Soviet SSBNs. To defend the pro-SSBN mission against criticisms t hat 
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it t hreatens escalation stability, Captain Linton Brooks has argued t hat .., the loss to 
conventional attack of one SSBN at a time over a period of days or weeks provides no 
single event sufficient to warrant the catastrophic decision to escalate to t he strategic 
level. ~ 211 The 0l"avy obviously forsees such a mission as tremendously difficult , and 
numerical and geographical factors enhance this difficulty. Yet the quali tati ve advantage 
provides at least the capability to attempt this mission. \Vhether or not t he mission can 
be successful, it is one which the Soviets clearly fear. Soviet naval doctrine has 
consistently placed a high priority on the defense of Soviet SSBNs; in the presence of a 
declared threat against the SSBNs (which was not present in U.S declaratory policy prior 
to formal codification of the Maritime Strategy), the concern for their naval strategic 
strike forces must increase. Confronted with U.S. SSNs of high capability, and the 
prospect of having to wage a defensive surface and air war for the control of its home seas 
concurrently with operations to defend their SSBNs, the Soviet Union's uncertainty over 
its prospects of success must increase. As a U.S. Admiral rather colloquially put it, "you 
have seen a 688 class submarine. It is a mean looking machine. They are paranoid about 
that big black submarine ... Uncertainty is the the most dangerous element in the planners' 
book. It just drives them nuts. In submarine warfare, we bring uncertainty to the table 
like nothing else." 212 Such credi bili ty as the U.S. possesses to threaten the destruction of 
Soviet SSBNs, though perhaps small, must increase Soviet planning uncertainties. 
Combined with a highly credible threat of attacks against Soviet naval forces in home 
waters and against Soviet bases, it significantly heightens Soviet concern for the defense 
of these areas, and hence also increases uncertainty over t he propects for success In a 
naval conflict. Confronted by this uncertainty , Soviet planners are more likely to be 
deterred from contemplating any form of aggression that might precipitate a superpower 
conflict. Further implications of U.S. forward operations capabilities will be discussed in 
the following section. 
4.3 The Utility of the Maritime Strategy 
Among the criticisms of the Maritime Strategy , two in particular have focused upon 
the mission of offensive sea control and the declared contribution which the global , 
offensive strategy makes to deterrence. Offensive sea control has been condemned, not 
only as a strategy which places major U.S. fleet elements at risk , but also as one which is 
unnecessary for protecting sea lines of communication from Soviet attacks in a war. The 
deterrent value of the Navy 's strategy has been doubted on the grounds that it is not 
credible (as discussed above ), and also on the grounds that naval actions , even in the 
context of horizontal escalation against Soviet asse ts in the Pacific. do not contribute 
significantly to deterring conflict wi th the Soviet Union, particularly conflict in Europe. 
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4.3.1 The Necessity of Offensive Sea Control 
Three major concerns have predicated t he U.S. :\Tavy 's declaration of an offensive 
sea control strategy; all t hree have been attacked as unfounded. The ~avy has claimed 
that, first, an offensive strategy would keep Soviet naval forces , particularly SSNs, tied up 
in their home waters, and therefore render them incapable of attacking U.S. and allied 
SLOes; second, that offensive, rather than defensive , sea control is more efficient 
militarily; and third, that an offensive strategy is necessary for protecting the security 
and integrity of allies such as Norway, Turkey , and Japan. 213 
The primary argument against the goal of keeping Soviet forces tied up in their 
home waters, and of aggressively attempting to destroy them t here, is that Soviet naval 
forces would remain in home waters to protect their SSBNs regardless of American 
decalaratory strategy. Emphasis is placed on the fact that " [Soviet] SSNs ' primary 
mission is to protect SSBNs, not to attack NATO 's SLOes." 214 In the Atlantic, Soviet 
SSNs must remain in home waters" ... because of the mere presence of American attack 
submarines in the area around the GIN [Greenland-Iceland-Norway] gap. They cannot 
risk leaving their SSBNs exposed to the formidable American SSN force." 215 A strategy 
of defensive sea control focused on destroying Soviet naval and naval aviation forces in 
the area of the GIN gap, it is argued, would still presen t a deterrent threat to the Soviets, 
while permitting the execution of an effective campaign of SLOe protection by the U.S. 
Navy in conjunction with allied navies. These arguments are made in the context of 
assertions that virtually every element of the Maritime Strategy is inappropriate. 
The Pacific aspect of offensive sea control has been challenged primarily on t he 
grounds that it is highly provocative and that it places Japanese territory at great risk. 
By "taking advantage of the fact that at any moment 70 to 75 percent of t he Soviet 
Pacific Fleet is in home waters, t he U.S. Pacific Fleet could, in t he event of a crisis, t rap 
t he Soviet Pacific Fleet behind choke point~ that close off the Soviets' Far East bases." 216 
However , "this strategy would seem to require preemptiv e action, since during a crisis the 
Soviets would certainly attempt to move their ships out of bases and ports early, before 
war actually began." 217 Because of the task of destroying Soviet bases , linked to 
offensive sea control in the Maritime Strategy , U.S. bases on Japanese territory " .. . are 
essential for coordinating offensive attacks against the Soviet Union." 218 The focus on 
attacking Soviet forces in their home waters , with logistical support from Japan has, 
according to critics, increased the likelihood of Soviet attacks against Japan . 
Both arguments regarding offensive sea control in the Atlantic and the Pacific, are 
not totally convincing in the context of the overall aims of the Maritime Strategy. First 
of all , t he Maritime Strategy , as enunciated by Admiral Watkins, recognizes t he 
likelihood of mainly defensive , home-water missions by t he Soviet Navy. 219 There seem 
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to be some potential advantages in the offensive operations evisaged by the :'-ravy. U.S. 
declaratory strategy and aggressive "C .S. forward move;nen ts encourage Soviet naval 
forces to retreat in preparation for complying wi t h their primary missions. In the words 
of Rear Admiral William Pendley, t he Director of the Strategy, Plans , and Policy Office 
of t he C~O, " ... early forward movements make it clear that .the Soviets will not be able 
to accomplish their primary naval missions--defense of t he homeland and protection of 
t heir SSBNs--by default. It also forecloses any single front advantage." 220 An offensive 
declaratory strategy accomplishes both the concentration of Soviet naval forces in their 
home waters, and also provides a means by which their security can be threatened. 
Should conflict occur , the retreat of Soviet naval forces into a defensive bastion lessens 
their ability to interdict SLOes; were the U.S. :'-ravy to adopt a relatively passive, 
defensive posture, more elements of the Soviet Navy would be free to attempt SLoe 
interdiction missions. Though a secondary mission, Soviet naval strategy places great 
value upon the destruction of enemy military, commercial , and military-support shipping 
in SLOes. This is particularly true in the case of a protracted conflict. Should their 
primary mission be accomplished without loss or effort , Soviet naval strategy and fleet 
capabilities suggest that the Soviet Fleets would attempt to perform their secondary 
missions in support of the overall war effort. 
Yet even before conflict begins, the forward offensive nature of the Maritime 
St.rategy provides a means for securing deterrence without resorting to war. It is safe to 
assume that if the U.S. ~avy were executing rapid forward movements and preparing for 
a conflict if deterrence could not be maintained, an extremely vital U.S. or allied interest 
would be in jeopardy, or at least perceived to be in jeopardy. Operations close to Soviet 
t erritory provide a means for the Navy to threaten Soviet vital interests , a point echoed 
repeatedly in Navy assertions that" this is where the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where 
we must be prepared to fight." 221 This threat may be capable of securing deterrence , by 
raising t he potential cost to the Soviets of a slide into conflict. More defensively oriented 
sea control stra tegies generally eschew t his potential means of a ttempting t o prevent 
conflict by menacing the Soviet Navy and the Soviet homeland. 
Should deterrence fail, the advantage of forward operations becomes t he abili ty to 
control the location and extent of naval battles. It should be noted t hat forward 
movement in the context of attempting to maintain de te rrence is always predicated upon 
the desire to maintain deterrence and at t he same t ime increase preparation for t he 
breakdown of deterrence; but aggression in the absence of war is specifically rejected. All 
attacks prescribed by the Maritime Strategy are stated to occur 'should war come. ' The 
declared t hreat to Soviet naval forces by the U.S. Navy increases the number of forces 
that will be arrayed defensively in home waters. In a conflict, being deployed in a 
..... 
t 
\1 
iii 
I' 
II 
1'1 
63 
forward position from which aggressive at t acks may be launched would give t he U.S. 
~avy the option of executing its s trategy to t he let t er , and attempting to destroy Soviet 
naval forces , SSBNs and homeland bases, or , given t hat the strategy is intended t o be 
flexible, to be content with having secured the protec t ion of SLOCs and to cont inue to 
threaten the Soviet ~avy with attacks, while maintaining a position of relative safety. It 
does not appear that details of U.S. naval strategy are 'set in stone; ' t herefore a shift 
away from declaratory strategy is not inconceivable, if U.S. and allied wartime objectives 
in other t han naval t heatres are being achieved. 
Yiilitarily , it would probably be advantageous to fight Soviet forces closer to t heir 
homeland than a strategy of defensive sea control would permit ; a defensive strategy 
could conceivably result in attacks against U.S. allies such as Japan, Norway , and Turkey 
early in a conflict. While attempting to destroy the Soviet fleet in its home waters would 
be extremely challenging, it is clear that a decision to maintain a more defensive posture 
could result in additional Soviet fleet elements gaining access to t he high seas and 
becoming a risk to U.S. and allied shipping and naval forces. By forcing them into 
defensive bastions before conflict begins, the U.S. Navy would be bet ter able to ensure 
that they did not escape, if necessary , through t he use of offensive attacks to destroy 
Soviet naval vessels. Also , Soviet naval strategy incorporates an element of power 
projection; in the event of a conflict, and in the absence of direct threats to t heir SSBNs 
or homeland , t hey would be quite likely to attempt this mission. Assaults on the 
t erritory of U.S. allies is likely, in an effort to secure safe passage to t he high seas for the 
Soviet Navy. 
The necessity of an offensive sea control posture is not absolute ; yet certain resul ts 
of such a s t ra tegy are appealing. First , t he encouragement , t hrough t he declaratory 
strategy , of Soviet naval deployments closer t o t he homeland; second , t he ability to better 
decide the location and nature of battles; third , t he protection of SLOCs by keeping the 
Soviet fleet at bay ; fourth , t he only possible employment of t he U.S. Na vy for t hreatening 
vi tal Soviet asse ts , as a potential means of enhancing deterrence; and fift h , a bette r 
ability to protect U.S. allies which lie close to the Sov iet Union or on t he flanks of the 
~ATO alliance. Some of these virtues of t he iVIaritime Strategy are subject t o 
considerations of relevance to deterrence and of possible escalatory consequences in a 
conflict. 
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4.3.2 Deterrence 
The cen tral goal of U.S. mili tary strategy, and therfore of the :vtaritime Strategy, is 
to preserve deterrence. A major criticism of u.s. naval strategy is that it is not relevant 
to deterrence, particularly not to the deterrence of conflict in Europe, which is defined by 
many analysts as the most vital area of U.S. interests. According to \learscheimer, 
... the yfaritime Strategy is fundamentally flawed, not only because it fails to 
enhance the deterrent posture in Europe, but also because it has meant spending 
large sums of money on the Navy that might have otherwise been spent on 
enhancing the fighting power of those forces that matter most for deterrence. 222 
He questions the value of potential U.S. naval operations in the Pacific, and the implicit 
doctrine of horizontal escalation which drives them. His argument is that, contrary to 
the assertion that the Soviet Union would have to shift forces away from Europe to meet 
a threat on their periphery, 
the Soviets could afford to absorb a temporary beating in the Far East while 
t hey were rolling up NATO 's forces in Central Europe. A setback on the 
periphery would not weaken their European effort in any meaningful way and, 
moreover, once the Soviets had consolidated their position in Western Europe, 
they could move massive forces to deal with problems on their periphery. 223 
However , Yfearscheimer fails to appreciate properly either the potential psychological and 
military value of horizontal escalation and disregards assertions he has made in in one of 
his earlier essays. In light of the increasing interest which the Soviets have shown in the 
Pacific, and the increasing value of U.S. interests in the region, the Yfari time Strategy's 
threat of potential worldwide conflict in the event of a war may be one of its most useful 
aspects for promoting deterrence. 
The main reason for threatening horizontal escaltion against the Soviet Union in the 
event of a war is to introduce potential costs and uncertainties into their planning, 
enhancing inhibitions toward considering aggression in any area, European or otherwise. 
This threat can be of ,-:alue only under the circumstance that war might be prolonged; in 
the event of a short war in which the Soviet Union was quickly victorious in Europe, 
Mearscheimer is quite correct that horizontal escaltion could have no value. Yet he 
ignores t he fact that both Soviet and U.S. military strategies, in recent years, have 
increasingly focused on the possi bility that a war, if it comes, will be a prolonged conflict. 
As discussed in the first two chapters, both superpowers have appeared to base naval 
procurement decisions on this prospect, at least in part. And Nlearscheimer himself has 
argued against the probability that the Soviets would ever be ' rolling up )l"A TO's forces 
in Central Europe. : His conclusions on that point are based on a number of factors, 
including evidence that force ratios are not as severely tilted in favour of the \Varsaw 
Pact as it might seem, the fact that the geography of the Central Front constrains the 
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number and size of possible invasion routes: and questions about the skills of the Soviets 
and their allies. His argument is quite strong, and he concludes that 
certainly, ~ATO does not have the capability to win a conventional war on 
the continent against t he Soviets. ~ATO does have , however , the wherewithal 
to deny the Soviets a quick victory and then to turn the conflict into a lengthy 
war of attrition , where ~ ATO's advantage in population and GNP would not 
bode well for the Soviets. 224. 
In the context of an extended war , horizontal escalation becomes a more viable concept. 
Given t hat the Soviets probably cannot achieve a quick victory in Europe, 
consideration must be given to ways in which deterrence in Europe might be strengthened 
so that aggression becomes even less attractive a prospect. The goal must be to decrease 
the prospects of rapid success, decrease the prospects of success altogether , and increase 
the potential costs that would be associated with aggression. NATO has modernized its 
LRT~Fs over the past four years in an effort to do each of these. But despite a failure to 
upgrade conventional forces, the essential aspects of Mearscheimer:s arguments continue 
to hold. Nonetheless, it is always possible that, because of a Soviet perception t hat t he 
NATO nuclear deterrent is not credible, and that t he balance of conventional forces may 
have shifted more in their favour, the attractiveness of invading Western Europe is 
increased. This is not to say that the Soviets would immediately, seriously consider it; 
rather, t his indicates a manner in which deterrence is undermined. The V1aritime 
Strategy's element of horizontal escalation provides a means by which the U.S. Navy, 
extant and useful for a variety of other missions in U.S. strategy, can also contribute to 
the potential costs of aggression in Europe and to the prevention of a rapid victory t here , 
and consequently providing a means of enhancing de terrence. 
In a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact , there is a good chance tha t a 
prolonged war of attrition could develop; t he strategy of attacking Soviet vital areas on 
their periphery provides a means of increasing the costs of starting a war and , potentially , 
of forcing resources away from the Central Front to deal with these other contingencies. 
Soviet interest in its Far Eastern Province has increased in recent years , and t he area 
which now hosts the largest of the Soviet fleets must be considered vital to the USS R. 225 
The credible threat of attacks against this region by t he U.S. Navy must cause increased 
uncertainty for Soviet planners. In a prolonged war for Europe, the possibility of a loss in 
t he Pacific t heatre could be perceived as threatening to t he Soviet Cnion, because a naval 
loss would increase the threat tha t t he Soviet homeland could come under direct attack. 
This could make reinforcements to t his theatre more likely; this prospect enhances 
effective de terrence. 
Both psychological and mi litary influences contribute the t he value of openlng a 
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second front in a protracted conflict, particularly against t he Soviet Union. In both of the 
World Wars of this century, Russia was the protagonist in important moves regarding the 
development of a second front. In \Vorld \Var I, the Schlieffen Plan of imperial Germany 
failed in part because German forces had to be shifted away from the invasion of France 
to cope with the Russian army, which had mobilized faster than expected, on the Eastern 
Front. In the second World \Var, the Soviet ~on-Aggression Pact permitted Nazi 
Germany to invade and overrun Western Europe; when Germany turned on its erstwhile 
ally , the CSSR urged its allies to open a second front in the West as quickly as possible to 
relieve the pressure on it. In 1943 and 1944, the splitting of German forces between two 
and later three fronts helped contribute to their defeat. Thus the CSSR should recognize 
from history the value of a two-front campaign in defeating an enemy (even more so 
because of the great value accorded by the Soviets to their 1945 campaign in Manchuria 
for the ultimate defeat of Japan), and be concerned about the prospects of facing such an 
attack themselves. 226 
Faced with a threat to what is now considered a vital region of the USSR, Soviet 
decisionmakers would be faced with increased uncertainty about the viability of going to 
war; in a war, actual attacks on this region by U.S. forces predeployed in the Pacific could 
cause the Soviets to shift more forces to the region to defend it, or at very worst 'fix' 
Soviet forces in .-\sia and prevent them from reinforcing the European front. 227 Analyst 
Colin Gray has best summarized the value of horizontal escalation, stating that 
if a campaign in Europe were to produce a stalemate, and if the Soviet Union 
would not agree to a prompt restoration of the status quo ante, the West would 
have little choice other than to seek to prosecute t he war wherever it could with 
the prospect of securing substantial advantage. Soviet sea power would have to 
be pursued, with prudence, into its 'bastion ' areas in order to stregthen \Vestern 
control of the key SLOCs, while t he ' long suit' of the alliance, naval power , 
inevitably would be employed to provide such pressure as it could to favor early 
war termination. 228 
By forcing t he Soviets to consider a second threat, in the absence of assurance of swift 
victory in Europe , horizontal escalation could contribute to the termination of a war , but 
moreover to the deterrence of conflict in the first place. 
4.4 The Potential for Escalation 
A central concern for many critics of the Maritime Strategy is the issue of 
escalation. The main criticism is that by carrying out aggressive attacks on Soviet naval 
forces, and by threatening bases in the Soviet homeland and Soviet SSBNs with 
destruction , U.S. naval strategy makes it more likely that nuclear weapons would be used 
in a conflict. This could be t he case, it is argued , either if U.s. forces succeed in their 
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at t acks against the Soviet \iavy, and leave t he Soviets with a choice between defeat and 
resorting to nuclear weapons , or if the V.S. ~avy manages to attack and destroy a 
portion of the Soviet SSBN fleet. Such an argument appeals to the logic that , by bringing 
C.S. and Soviet naval forces into large-scale combat close to the Soviet homeland, th e 
chances of conflict intensifying are greater than if the two ~avies were to engage in a 
more limited manner further from the Sovi'et coast. This section assesses the validity of 
the claims that this element of current U.S. naval strategy is actually 'dangerously 
destabilizing ' and frought with 'escalatory potential. ' 
One analyst has asked rhetorically , "would not the side that started losing in a 
massive conventional conflict be sorely tempted to employ nuclear weapons? Is not this 
the essence of NATO's own doctrine of nuclear first use?" 229 Should U.S. forces 
successfully destroy major elements of the Soviet fleet, and be able to carry the fight into 
Soviet home waters, the U.S. fleet would enhance its position from which to threaten or 
carry out attacks against land targets in the USSR. However, it is argued that in this 
event, " ... the Soviets would be able to use their nuclear weapons to blow through the U.S. 
forces stationed at Japanese choke points rather than accept humiliating defeat in their 
home waters." 230 According to this point of view, U.S. naval strategy risks hastening the 
use of nuclear weapons by seeking a naval victory in the conventional phase of a general 
conflict. 
Closely related to this argument is the notion that , either by putting Soviet SSBNs 
at risk through offensive operations against other elements of t he Soviet fleet, or by 
act'ually attacking Soviet SSBNs, the U.S. Maritime Strategy incorporates strategies 
which risk a devastating Soviet first-use of nuclear weapons. With regard to U.S. attacks 
against naval forces and bases, Barry Posen has argued that " if such attacks should 
threaten the survivability of Soviet ballistic missile submarines, as they might, how would 
the Soviet 'Union react? It could decide that a nearly-certain-to-succeed nuclear strike 
against t hose t hreatening carriers was both lucrative and necessary ." 231 The Navy's 
declared intention to fight in the Pacific at the same time as in th e A tlantic increases th e 
risk of escalation; Posen argues that this creates " ... still greater escalation pressures 
because the entire Soviet strategic submarine force would then be threatened." 232 
Because of the declared intention in the Maritime Strategy to take direct action against 
Soviet SSBNs, it is argued that" ... an offensive sea control strategy would result in the 
destruction of some portion of the Soviets' strategic re taliatory forces .... the Soviets 
probably would not stand idly oy while t he strategic nuclear balance shifted against 
them." 233 Soviet responses could be a strategic strike against U.S. strategic forces to 
redress the balance, nuclear strikes against U.S. SSNs (perhaps with nuclear depth-
bombs), or theatre nuclear attacks against U.S. surface vessels to introduce the th reat of 
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nuclear escalation. 234 Cri t ics also discount t he possibility that ei t her the offensive sea 
control strategy or direct attacks upon Soviet SSBNs could actually force the Soviets to 
. fl· ?35 agree to termInate a con lct.-
It is not clear how risky t he missions of offensive attacks against Soviet land targe ts 
and SSBNs, proposed by the :'v1aritime Strategy , actualy are; while the criticisms are valid 
to some extent, t here are factors which are not t aken into account by the critics which 
t end to limit the extent to which the Nlaritime Strategy can be considered 'dangerously' 
escalatory. Soviet strategy and force structure suggest that the USSR contemplates the 
possibility of fighting a prolonged conventional conflict , if necessary; combined with this 
is t he probability that, in a conflict, Soviet forces would be deployed so as to decrease t he 
chance that Soviet SSBNs suffer serious attrition, even if only conventional weapons are 
used. The concern with conventional operations is perhaps partly a product of the 
tactical nuclear capability of the u.s. Navy, and the threat of counter-escalation which it 
carnes even during conventional operations; the resort to tactical nuclear strikes in a 
situation of mutual threat is less likely. Finally , the prospects for war termination 
through offensive operations appear better than most critics admit. 
In this decade especially, Soviet military strategy has focused more on the 
possibility that Soviet forces might be required to fight a protracted conventional war. 
~aval strategy and force procurement have reflected this trend. Given these factors, and 
the probability that Soviet tactical nuclear weapons use at sea would only be authorized 
in the context of nuclear weapons use on land,236 there appears to be some possibility 
that restraint in escalation would be shown by the Soviets in early stages of a conflict. 
According to one U.S. naval officer, " Soviet wri t ings are quite clear that t hey will 
undertake attacks on nuclear-capable forces with conventional forces where they have t he 
capability." 237 Besides this, the chance of serious threat to Soviet SSBNs early in a 
conflict is not great, thus lessening the possibility of escalation on this account. Soviet 
naval strategy contains an element of strategic defense, which includes conventional 
attacks against U.S. SSBNs, but which t he Soviets have lacked the capability to carry 
out. This element of Soviet strategy is one reason for which the Soviets have always 
deemed u.S. attacks against Soviet SSBNs possible (by 'doctrinal mirror-imaging '),238 
and for which the Soviet Navy has prepared by developing a workable concept of 
defensible SSBN bastions since the late 1970s. 239 
In addition , increased chances of survivability for other legs of t he Soviet strategic 
t riad suggest that the Soviets could tolerate some attrition of SSBNs without responding 
by escalation. 240 Finally, even officers in the U.S. Navy are not sanguine about the 
chances of serious Soviet SSBN attrition through conventional attacks , a factor t hat 
would be reinforced by t he probability that in the early stages of a conflict, u .S. forces 
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would not even be permitted to directly attack Soviet SSB;\ls, being rather confronted at 
barriers by Soviet SSNs and SSs. This would permit U.S. attacks against such forces 
while Soviet SSBNs sought to hide deep in the sea bastions, further decreasing the chance 
of SSBN attrition and allowing U.S. forces to forego the possible need to differentiate 
between Soviet attack and ballistic missile submarines, a factor which further inhibits the 
chance of escalation. 241 
As a conflict fought within the framework of the Nlaritime Strategy progressed , 
there would be at least one major disincentive to Soviet nuclear attacks on U.S. naval 
vessels. This is the threat of U.S. counter-escalation against Soviet homeland targets, and 
the concurrent threat that once nuclear war has been initiated at a naval tactical nuclear 
level, the possibility of an aU-out nuclear war would be increased. The U .S. ~avy carries 
a variety of nuclear weapons on board its surface ships and submarines, to a total of 
about 3500 tactical weapons available for use. 242 Although there is no stated U.S. 
doctrine for the use of these weapons,243 the Soviet Union would have to be cautious 
about giving the U.S. incentives to use them. Nuclear attacks against U.S. vessels, at any 
stage of a conflict, are deterred by the presence of tactical nuclear weapons aboard U.S. 
ships; because some U.S. SSNs carry Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of carrying a 
nuclear warhead, even a large-scale nuclear attack against the U.S. surface fleet could not 
be certain of eliminating the threat of direct, tactical nuclear retaliation. Given the value 
which the U.S. places upon its Navy, the Soviets must recognize that" ... attacks against 
U.S. vessels are likely to unleash emotional pressures for punitive strikes against higher-
value targets in the attacker's homeland." 244 This prospect for limiting conflict to the 
conventional level because of the threat of unlimited escalation if nuclear weapons are 
in troduced is echoed by analyst Michael N1ccGwire, who considers" ... that the prospect of 
a Soviet nuclear response to the sinking of an SSBN is extremely remote, especially in 
view of the Soviet desire to keep conflict conventional as long as possible to avoid nuclear 
destruction of t he Soviet homeland." 245 These potential sources of inhibition tend to 
indicate that nuclear weapons use~ even by a force faced with conventional defeat, is not 
as likely as some critics of the Maritime Strategy assert. 
The final factor which suggests that nuclear weapons might not be used, even in the 
event of U.S. ~avy offensive forward operations, is t hat, in the event of a conflict 
remaining limited to conventional weapons, war termination could be possible on the 
grounds that neither side has an incentive to continue fighting. This argument is 
somewhat different than the one which underpins the Maritime Strategy's defense of its 
pro-SSBN operations, namely that the shift in the nuclear correlation of forces provides 
war termination leverage. In light of the discussion above, the ability of t he U.S. to 
significantly alter the nuclear balance in this manner is uncertain. However , once 
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deterrence has broken down, an end to a conflict might be achieved through denying the 
Soviets Union the ability to prevail, by bI unting a Soviet ground attack in to \Vestern 
Europe and by defeating Soviet naval forces, in two theatres if necessary. At the same 
time, the presence of countervailing and threatening nuclear forces on both sides limits 
t he attractiveness of resorting to these weapons in a losing situation (this argument 
would also apply to :\T A. TO forces in Europe, unfortunate from a Western perspective). 
By the presence of nuclear weapons before conflict, and the possiblity of their use in 
escalating a conventional war, deterrence is enhanced;246 in a conventional conflict, the 
threat to both sides in terms of destruction from nuclear weapons seems to enhance the 
chances of termination rather than escalation. 
In a conventional superpower conflict in which the U.S. can demonstrate that the 
Soviets cannot prevail, and in which it can communicate the aim of restoring the status 
quo rather than any desire to eradicate the Soviet state or system, the chance of war 
termination without resort to nuclear weapons appears to be good. 247 The ability to 
clearly convey these aims to the Soviets, especially in a situation where the Soviet 
homeland stands to be directly threatened with attacks, is an issue that cannot be treated 
here; however, it is clear that the U.S. would have strong incentives to find the means to 
communicate its aims, both because of the lesson of overreaching goals taught by the 
Korean conflict and because of the continuing possibility of nuclear weapons use until the 
conflict is ended. The possibility of achieving war termination on terms favourable to the 
U.S. (but acceptable and not punitive to the Soviet Union), while limiting a superpower 
con'flict to conventional weapons, does not appear as bleak as thought by some critics. 
4.5 The Impact on Japan 
The new emphasis in the ~vlaritime Strategy upon forward offensive operations and 
t he stress on the ability to carry out operations in two (or more) t heatres simultaneously 
has had a variety of implications for U.S. allies and friends in t he Pacific. This has been 
t rue particularly for Japan , which has been called ~ ... the keystone of [t he U.S. :j Pacific 
coalition." 248 Critics of U.S. naval strategy have argued t hat forward operations in the 
Pacific during a superpower conflict increase the chances of attacks on Japan. How valid 
is this criticism, and what benefits might accrue to Japan (and by extention , to other 
U.S. allies in the region) from the shift in U.S. strategy ? 
According to two critics, " ... Japan has become partner to a provocative strategy 
over which the Japanese have no influence or controL,,249 In this view, 
America 's regional allies--particularly Japan--stand to lose a great deal from 
Washington 's new offensive strategy. U.S. military facilities in Japan are so 
close to the Soviet coast that in a crisis they would be highly provocative to 
...... 
'1 
'\ 
1 
III 
~i 
U 
i 
I I 
II, 
I 
l 
YIoscow; thus they are likely to draw Japan immeditely into any superpower 
clash. 250 
71 
Because of the presence of u.s. bases on Japanese soil, critics contend that the chance of a 
Soviet attack in the event of a superpower conflict is increased by the offensive thrust of 
new U.S. declaratory strategy. Andrew ~1ack has argued that 
since Japan, with its US air and naval bases, communications networks and 
supply dumps, plays such a crucial role in US strategy, it would automatically 
be involved in any horizontal escalation operations - operations which would 
very probably result in Soviet attacks against Japan and ... pose very real risks of 
nuclear escalation. 251 
The primary concern of the critics is that Japan might find itself under attack in a war 
which" ... might have little or nothing to do with Japanese interests.r-252 The extent to 
which these criticisms are valid is not clear, especially in view of possible benefits to 
Japan (and other regional nations) that result from the increased focus of U.S. naval 
strategy on the Pacific theatre. 
Two factors blunt the thrust of the arguments that u.S. strategy creates a threat to 
Japan. First, Japanese perceptions of threat and Japanese government security 
conceptions indicate that Japan would consider a more robust U.S. commitment to the 
preservation of deterrence in ~orth East Asia a benefit to Japan. Second, Soviet strategy 
and geographical considerations in the Pacific suggest that Japan might be at risk from 
Soviet aggression regardless of U.S. declaratory strategy. Japan's primary security 
concern is the Soviet Union. According to analyst Yong-Ok Park, "Japan, like the United 
States, considers the Soviet threat as the most important ... .It also well recognizes the 
growing need for cooperation with the United States and South Korea mainly in order to 
secure the [SLOes] around the Japanese islands and blockade the straits--including the 
Korea Strait--against Soviet advance into the Pacific." 253 In this context, the Japanese 
government is concerned with upgrading the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense, which 
is promised by the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty of 1960, and with providing means 
for Japanese self-defense in cooperation with the U.S. forces. Since the beginning of t he 
1980s in particular, Japan has perceived an increased potential threat from the USSR 
because of the Soviet military buildup in the Far East;254 in line with this perception , 
Japan has expressed views of defense objectives which seek to enhance deterrence of the 
Soviet Union. Prime \lfinister Yasuhiro Nakasone outlined these objectives in 1983 , 
stating that 
... the whole Japanese archipelago or the Japanese islands should be like an 
unsinkable aircraft carrier putting up a tremendous bulwark of defence against 
the infiltration of the [Soviet ] Backfire bomber. To prevent Backf£re from 
penetrating should be our first goal. The second target objective should be to 
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have complete and full control of the four straits that go through the Japanese 
islands so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines or other naval 
activities. The third objective is to secure and maintain the ocean lines of 
communication. 255 
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From this perspective, Japan's defense objectives are broadly in line with U.S. objectives 
in the Pacific, since ~ ... the desirable way for Japan to avoid war is to possess the 
capability to make a Soviet attack in the Far East extremely costly.~256 
It is probably true that the likelihood of an attack on Japan is greatest in the 
context of a superpower conflict; however, it is debatable whether this is a product of a 
'provocative' U.S. strategy into which Japan has been inserted (or has integrated itself), 
or whether this is a result of Soviet strategic interests in the Far East and necessities of 
Soviet strategy. The evidence suggests that this second explanation is at least as credible 
as the first. Many analysts consider that it is possible that Japan would come under 
attack in a war because of the need perceived by the Soviet Union to surge its naval forces 
out of the Sea of Japan in a conflict. Most scenarios of conflict in the Pacific assume that 
the superpowers have begun their war iIi another theatre, and that it has expanded to the 
Far East; current U.S. naval strategy considers that it could be useful to carry out 
operations in more than one theatre. But Soviet strategy in the Pacific could result in 
attacks on Japan, irrespective of U.S. strategy and actions. Paul Dibb asserts that one of 
the missions of Soviet Far Eastern military forces" .. .is to launch conventional attacks 
against China and against US and allied naval and air force in the northern and 
mid-Pacific .... " 257 Nlore specifically, Soviet naval missions including sea control, sea 
denial, and SLOC interdiction in the Pacific could hinge on control of the exits from its 
home waters, which pass primarily through straits overlooked by Japan. Soviet strategy 
incorporates an element of force projection, though its capabilities are modest; yet it has 
been noted that "a surge with only minimal addition of assets would give them the 
capability to ... mount a small amphibious operation. Likely targets would be the La 
Perouse [Soya] Strait or perhaps one of the other choke points constraining the surface 
fleet. ~ 258 Given the importance of the Japanese straits to the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the 
chances of an assault upon them in the context of a war are quite good, and it can be 
argued that Japan is therefore " ... threatened not because of its military alliance but 
because of its geostrategic situation. It would be unreasonable not to expect a major 
power to attempt to seize a geostrategically important area before its opponent utilizes it, 
particularly if the country at issue were inadequately armed." 259 
The value for Japan of U.S. naval strategy as expressed in the Maritime Strategy is 
two-fold. First, the reemphasis on the vital nature of U.S. interests in the Pacific and the 
assumption of the need to fight a conflict in two theatres at once, if necessary, has been a 
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reaSSUrIng factor following moves in the 1970s to decrease U.S. commitments in Asia. 
Second, a U.S. strategy which has been redressed in an effort to enhance deterrence by 
maintaining an offensive capability in the Pacific region has bee.n seen as dovetailing with 
Japanese efforts to enhance deterrence by improving defensive capabilities. In view of 
Japanese concern regarding possible Soviet threats, the attention given to the Pacific 
theatre in current U.S. naval strategy has helped to alleviate fears that the U.S. 
commitment to its allies in the Far East was weakening, at a time when the threat was 
grOWIng. Since the early 1970s, " ... doubts had been growing in the region about the 
willingness of the United States to maintain the balance of power." 260 U.S. naval 
strategy in the 1980s has contributed to relieving some of these doubts. U.S. officials 
have stressed the importance of the Pacific in terms of alliances, security treaties, and 
trading parters which the U.S. preserves in the region, and have promised both in 
declaratory strategy and through force increases to defend U.S. interests in the Pacific. 261 
The increased credibility of the promise, if not the promise itself (which had been made 
by previous U.S. Administrations), seems to be the factor which has been most significant 
in the perceptions of U.S. allies. As a result, "questions about U.S. reliability as an ally, 
which arose when President Carter broke with Taiwan and proposed drastic cuts in 
Korea, have largely been laid to rest since 1980." 262 
The second value of the Maritime Strategy is the emphasis which it places upon 
operations in the Pacific to strengthen deterrence regionally and globally. Arguments 
that U.S. strategy is provocative, escalatory, irrelevant, or incredible seem to be 
overstated; there does appear to be at least some deterrent value in the declaratory 
strategy for the Pacific region. In this decade, Japanese defense policy, which stresses 
defensive operations, has come to be seen as useful means on providing a deterrent to the 
perceived threat from the Soviet Union, to which the offensive elements of U.S. naval 
strategy have been considered an appropriate and important complement. This appears 
to be one of the important implications of the Japanese 'defense objectives' outlined by 
Prime YIinister Nakasone, which propose missions for the Japanese Self Defense Force 
(SDF) which could contribute to the U.S. deterrent posture in the region, and which 
would contribute to the U.S. ability to concentrate on offensive operations in the event of 
a conflict. In this manner, " ... Japan's defence capabilities in surrounding waters and in 
the air space above them will complement the US sea control and projection forces in the 
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.,,263 The combination of U.S. posture and increased 
Japanese defensive capabilities makes the potential cost-s to the Soviet Union of 
operations in a Pacific conflict greater, thereby enhancing deterrence of the perceived 
threat in Asia, and by doing so decreasing the attractiveness of conflict at any point 
around the world. 
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Both Sou th Korea, as a l i .S. ally , and China, as a nation of (at least) regional 
importance, are affected to some extent by the Pacific dimensions of the ~1aritime 
Strategy. However , the effects are not as significant as those on Japan, for a variety of 
reasons. Consideration of the factors (historical, political, and strategic) which affect the 
relationships between the U.S. and South Korea and between the U.S. and China are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. In the case of South Korea , the \tlaritime Strategy, wi th 
its emphasis on forward operations, has been one element which has " ... reassured the 
Koreans of the viability of the U.S. defense commitment." 264 But the significance of 
changes in U.S. naval strategy is not as great for South Korea, which perceives the 
greatest threat from ~orth Korea, a land power directly across its border. Therefore, 
U.S. robustness in ground forces and aircraft on the Korean Peninsula is of the greatest 
importance for South Korea, and maritime support from the U.S. would supplement the 
ground forces. United States relations with the People's Republic of China, and the 
relations within the U.S.-USSR-PRC triangle are complex enough to warrant several 
separate studies; it is only in the context of overall Sino-Soviet-American relations that 
the effect of a stronger, more potentially aggressive U.S. presence in the Pacific on China 
could be analysed. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the validity of a number of criticisms which have been 
levelled at elements of the U.S. Maritime Strategy, and the implications of these 
criticisms for Pacific operations. Though it is difficult to analyze t he value of a 
warfighting strategy which first and foremost seeks the preservation of deterrence as long 
as its primary function is secured, a number of points can be made in conclusion. First , 
the accuracy of many criticisms of the Maritime Strategy is suspect, to the extent that 
contrary evidence and counterarguments are not always considered in an adequate 
fashion. The result is that the force of conclusions which attack U.S. naval strategy is 
sometimes diminished. This is t rue particularly with regard t o criticisms of the doctrine 
of horizontal escalation which is implicit in t he Maritime Strategy , and of the increased 
focus in naval strategy upon operations in the Pacific t heatre. 
The U.S. Navy appears to possess t he capability to at least threaten credibly the 
mISSIOns which are outlined in current naval strategy. In t he absence of consensus on 
some aspects of the strategy, and an uncertainty about how declaratory strategy would 
translate into operational strategy, it is impossible to be certain what action the Navy 
would t ake , or how successfully the Navy could carry out attacks against Soviet forces in 
a war. Yet t he presence of offensive strategic concepts in the declaratory policy , 
combined with t he capability to at least credibly attempt t he stated missions, has the 
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effect of raIsIng the potential costs of a conflict to the Soviet Union , and thereby of 
enhancing deterrence. By assuming a posture that threatens to 'carry the tight to t he 
enemy ' in a war, the U.S. )lavy would force the Soviet Union to concentrate its naval 
forces close to its homeland, in an effort to carry out its primary missions of defending 
SSBNs in their bastions and protecting the homeland. This decreases the likelihood that 
the Soviet fleet would have forces available to effectively pursue its secondary missions, 
including SLOe interdiction and power projection. Similarly , an offensive posture 
preserves for the U.S. the ability to decide where and how (or even if) to fight, and 
permits threats to Soviet homeland bases to be preserved, which could have utility for 
negotiating an end to a conflict. The threat of forward operations appears to have more 
value for deterrence than many critics are willing to concede. 
Because -the Navy's strategy has emphasized the need for a strong posture in the 
Pacific theatre, both to deter the Soviet Union in the region and from aggression in 
Europe, there have been important implications for the region regarding the utility of the 
strategy for actually achieving deterrence, and for enhancing the level of U.S. 
commitment to regional allies. The threat of possible attacks against t he Soviet Far East 
has some deterrent value, because it has become a region of vital Soviet interest; indeed , 
it forms part of their homeland. In the unlikely event of a conflict, pressure from U.S. 
naval action against the Soviet Far East holds the promise of forcing the termination of 
t he conflict, on terms favourable to the U.S. and its allies. This could happen only in the 
event of a protracted war; there is evidence to indicate that the prospects of war being 
protracted, and indeed remaining conventional if it occurs, are good. 
Pressures exist on both the U.S. and Soviet sides against the early use of nuclear 
weapons in a conflict, primarily centered on the threat of counterescalation which both 
sides can bring to bear at both the tactical and strategic nuclear level. Finally , the 
explicit statement that operations in the Pacific theatre are envisioned as simultaneous to 
operations in other theatres in a conflict contributes to allaying t he fears of U.S. allies in 
East Asia about the U.S. commitment to maintaining the balance of power in the region 
and to defending the U.S. allies. Japan, which has been considered by some critics as a 
likely target for Soviet attacks, due to U.S. strategy , appears likely to come under attack 
in a superpower conflict regardless of U.S. strategy , simply because of its strategic value 
to the Soviets for securing their major naval objectives. Forward offensive operations, 
t hreatened by the U.S. Navy , combined with an enhanced defensive capability from the 
Japanese , more effectively deter conflict in the ~orth Pacific region. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
This decade has witnessed an increase in the level of military competition between 
t he Soviet Union and the United States in the Pacific Ocean, along with an increase in 
the interests of both superpowers in the region. The Soviet Union has come to consider 
its Far Eastern Province more important, not least because, from its eastern shores, the 
USSR has access to the increasingly strong economies of the Pacific Rim and can claim 
the title of Pacific power. The Soviet Union has expressed an interest in improving its 
relations with regional nations, and at the same time has increased its naval and other 
military forces in the region. The U.S. has for a long time perceived the Pacific to be an 
area of interest, and this has become even more true in the past few years, as U.S. trade 
with Pacific nations has surpassed trade with Europe. The U.S. has also expressed 
concern over the Soviet military build up in the Far East. In the context of the increased 
interests of both superpowers in the Pacific, changes in the military force structures and 
strategies of the USSR and the U.S. have had important implications for the region. This 
the'sis has attempted to place developments in the Pacific in the context of overall Soviet 
and U.S. military strategy, to examine the changes in strategy that have taken place in 
recen t years, and to consider the ramifications of U.S. naval strategy in the Pacific Ocean 
in light of these factors. 
Overall Soviet military strategy has undergone some alterations in recent years, 
which have had implications for the missions of the Soviet Navy and the forces the ~avy 
deploys. Goals of military strategy have remained fairly consistent, with a continued 
emphasis on maintaining deterrence, and retaining the objective of victory should 
deterrence of t he U.S. fail. However, doctrine regarding the type and intensity of 
potential conflict has undergone some changes. Soviet declaratory strategy since the late 
1970s has revealed a greater appreciation of the potential for unrestricted escalation in a 
nuclear war, with the consequence that neither side could attain anything resembling 
'victory.' Thus, while maintaining (and indeed expanding) their nuclear arsenal, the 
Soviets have sought more balanced capabilities, and have adjusted their military strategy 
to prepare for the possibility of a protracted war fought strictly with conventional 
weapons. This trend towards improved conventional capabilities has been especially 
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visible in the increased size and quality of the ~avy, which seems now to possess adequate 
forces quantitatively and to a lesser extent qualitatively to potentially achieve some of its 
missions without resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. 
Since the late 1970s, there has been a fairly significant increase in the level and 
quality of Soviet military forces in the Far East. This has been notable particularly in 
the Soviet Navy's Pacific Fleet, which has increased in size proportionately more than 
other Soviet fleets, and which has received a larger share of newer, more capable Soviet 
vessels. The enhanced capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet reflect an effort throughout 
the Soviet Navy to close the qualitative gap between Western forces and Soviet forces. 
The result has been the development of a true 'blue-water' navy, able to contemplate not 
only more traditional Soviet naval missions such as strategic strike and homeland defense, 
but also more offensive missions and increased peacetime presence in support of Soviet 
interests. The Soviet Pacific Fleet has received some priority in the deployment of newer 
vessels, due to increasing Soviet interest in the region, the need for self-sufficiency for the 
relatively isolated Pacific Fleet, and the expansions of the naval missions that could be 
useful and possible to contemplate in the Pacific. Acquisition of basing rights at Cam 
Ranh Bay in Vietnam has allowed the Soviets to maintain a permanent presence in South 
East Asia. This has resulted in a greater Soviet ability to project forces into the Indian 
Ocean, the establishment of forward deployed forces to counter Chinese or u.S. actions in 
the region, a facility for conducting surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations, and 
enhanced prestige and ability to exert political influence in the region . 
. The Soviet Pacific Fleet, having grown in size and capability, continues to be 
deployed primarily for the mission of strategic strike, with SSBNs which could seek 
sanctuary in the strongly defended bastion of the Sea of Ohkotsk in the event of a 
conflict. Newer surface ships and submarines have enhanced the Soviet ability to conduct 
mISSIons which include controlling the seas in their immediate vicinity , and to use naval 
forces and naval aviation to attempt sea-lane interdiction or power projection. SLOC 
interdiction could be important in an extended conflict, though it would be of less value 
in the Pacific than a comparable mission in tht Atlantic theatre, as SLOCs are of most 
value in a conflict for sustaining ground forces which would be deployed on a larger scale 
in Europe. Also, Pacific SLOes are harder to interdict because of the greater distances in 
the Pacific Ocean. Power projection, carried out in the form of amphibious assaults 
under air cover provided from the mainland, could be useful in securing the straits by 
which Soviet ships would have to pass to t he open sea. As capability has grown, more 
attention has been paid to these secondary missions; Soviet ship basing at Cam Ranh Bay 
could conceivably enhance these missions even more. Yet the facilities in Vietnam have 
not been configured to substantially support these secondary missions , leading to a 
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conclusion that, although they could be attractive and useful for t he Soviet Union t o 
attempt under some circumstances, they have not increased significantly in prominence 
within Soviet naval strategy. ;vfore significantly, the increased size and firepower of the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet has permitted a more extensive , and potentially effective, peacet ime 
presence mISSIOn. Though the priorities of t he Soviet :"Iavy have not changed 
substantially, its increased capability and potential for carrying out peacetime and 
secondary wartime missions have been a source of concern and perceived threat to the 
U.S. and its allies in the Pacific. 
In the 1980s, the U.S. has carried out a military buildup and has also changed some 
of the elements of its military strategy; in the process , the U.S. ~avy has undergone the 
most improvement and the most apparent shifts in strategy. U.S. military strategy now 
takes into account the possibility of fighting a war on more than one front, with the Navy 
playing a vital role in this capability. Military strategy has been focused for decades 
upon the principles of deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity. In the 1970s, 
the trauma of the Vietnam war led to decreased defense spending and smaller force levels 
in the U.S.; at the same time, military strategy was retrenched to attempt to better bring 
the ends of strategy in line with the means available. U.S. declaratory strategy in that 
decade focused on the possibility of responding to one major and one minor contingency 
simultaneously; the naval strategy of the period provided for forces to swing from the 
Pacific to the Atlantic, or vice-versa, in a conflict. Despite reassertions of the importance 
of U.S. interest in the Pacific, and the continued promise to defend those interests, there 
was a perception that U.S. Administrations were stressing the defense of Europe in their 
military planning, to the detriment of other theatres. U.S. declaratory naval strategy 
also indicated more defensive and passive roles for the Navy, including SLOe convoy 
missions and point defense. 
Declaratory strategy in the 1980s has gone to great lengths to redefine military 
strategy generally and the Navy's strategy in particular. The plan to respond to multiple 
contingencies simultaneously has become part of overall strategy , prompted in part by the 
recognition of the growing importance of the Pacific region for the United States, in part 
because of the perceived Soviet threat in the region, and in part because of a belief that 
increased attention to the Pacific could enhance deterrence and reassure U.S. allies in the 
regIOn. U.S. planners considered that it could be useful in a conflict to escalate , not 
vertically, but horizontally against the Soviet Union, by opening a second front in the 
Pacific following aggression in Europe. This feature in particular has represented a shift 
away from earlier declaratory strategy; the means by which such horizontal escalation 
would be conducted, namely offensive, aggressive attacks by the U.S. Navy against the 
Soviet Fleet and potentially against the Soviet homeland , are also a significant break with 
earlier strategy. 
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At the operational level, a shift in strategy is less apparent, because the operational 
strategy of the U.S. Navy in the 1970s appears not to have been completely in agreement 
with declaratory policy. There is evidence which suggests that t he Navy's stra tegy 
included offensive elements, and not merely the defensive roles emphasized by 
Administration officials; at the same time, it must be recognized that in a crisis or 
conflict, an Administration with declaratory views limiting the missions of the Navy 
would probably have constrained naval operations in practice. Also, the statements of a 
some Navy officers suggest that at least some of t he less offensive declaratory strategy 
had been assumed at the operational level, a view particularly evident among officers who 
have welcomed the 'shift ' in naval strategy. In t he absence of readily available 
information on U.S. operational strategy, a certain conclusion is not possible; but it 
appears that the operations conceived in the declaratory strategy of t he 1980s reflect a 
significant change from declaratory strategy of t he 1970s, and to at least some extent 
operational strategy has changed as well. 
U.S. ~aval strategy since 1980 has gone through a variety of changes at the 
declaratory level; by early 1986, an authoritative statement of the major elements of the 
strategy was made by t he Chief of Naval Operations. 265 U .S. ~1aritime Strategy, as 
enunciated in this document, reflected the concerns for multi- theatre operations and 
offensive operations in a conflict which had charact erized the shift away from previous 
declaratory strategies. It also reasserted t he importance for U.S. strategy generally of 
other mISSIOns of the Navy, including peacetime presence, CrISIS response, and power 
projection in conflicts not involving the superpowers. It declared that a mission of 
attacking Soviet SSBNs in a conflict would be part of offensive strategy, a view which has 
been and continues to be t he ~ubject of some debate. 
U.S. officials , naval and civilian, have explicitly stated that the prevIOUS swmg 
strategy was abandoned partly because it did not provide an adequate basis for protection 
of U .S. vital interests in t he Pacific. In light of an increased Soviet military presence in 
the region, it was necessary to promise and plan for a more cer tain commitment to the 
security of U.S. regional allies. The Maritime Strategy has responded to these concerns 
by paying more attention to strategy considerations in the Pacific , and the Navy has also 
expanded and improved the Pacific Fleets. Current U.S. naval strategy declares the 
intention to fight in forward areas in support of U.S. allies located in those areas, 
incl uding Japan and South Korea , and the offensive operations in the Pacific are 
envisioned as contributing to deterrence of the Soviet Union generally. 
The Navy has come under criticism for its new declaratory strategy; however, it 
appears that many of t he criticisms are not entirely valid, and that t here are in fact 
benefits to be derived from the Maritime Strategy. Despite a continuing gap between 
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ends and means of military strategy, it seems that deterrence, the major goal 'of U.S. 
strategy, can be sustained even wi th 1ess t han ideal force levels. The shift from a swing 
strategy to one of horizon tal escalation , the emphasis in current strategy on offensive 
rather than defensive missions for the )lavy, and quantitative and qualitative force 
improvements have enhanced the U.S. deterrent posture. Despite improvements in Soviet 
forces, the U.S. generally maintains a qualitative advantage in most aspects of military 
power, especially naval power, and enough, apparently, to credibly threaten to carry out 
U.S. naval missions. Support from u.s. allies also improves the credibility of threatened 
U.S. naval operations. 
The mission which has received the most attention, attacks against Soviet SSBNs, is 
the one which is least likely to succeed, given Soviet attention to defense of their SSBNs 
within sanctuaries; in light of this, and the continuing debate within the Navy regarding 
pro-SSBN attacks, it is also the element of the Maritime Strategy least likely to be 
executed. Particularly in the Sea of Ohkotsk, the U.S. Navy would find this mission 
difficult. There is a possibility that this mission, still a subject of debate in naval circles, 
might not be undertaken. This possibility, together with the existence of countervailing 
nuclear capabilities in both the U.S. and Soviet navies at a tactical level , and increased 
emphasis in both u.S. and Soviet strategy and force structures upon conventional 
contingencies, makes it less likely that Soviet nuclear escalation in response to offensive 
U.S. naval attacks would occur. There would probably be less of a t hreat to Soviet 
SSBNs in a conflict than some critics assert, and possible U.S. t actical nuclear attacks 
against Soviet homeland bases in retaliation for nuclear strikes on U.S. vessels provide an 
apparept disincentive to initiating a nuclear exchange. It seems that criticisms of the pro-
SSBN mission are somewhat overstated, particularly in their assertions that counterforce 
coercion is the primary element of t he .'vlaritime Strategy. While valid t o some extent, 
assertions that the mission is potentially dangerous generally do not recognize that 
attacks against Soviet SSBNs are only one option in U.S. naval strategy, and that 
potential draw backs of this mission do not necessarily discredi t the overall stra tegy . 
Pacific missions of the U.S. Navy are import ant for the purpose of enhancing 
deterrence, reassuring regional allies, and providing a means for allied defense in a 
conflict. In an extended conflict begun in Europe , naval pressure in East Asia could be 
one possible means of forcing war termination and a return to the status quo. The 
t hreatened employment of naval forces in a 'second front ' attack adds uncertainties to 
Soviet planning, and increases the potential costs involved in aggression against U.S. 
allies. Because of increased Soviet interest in their eastern homeland , the chances that 
t he Soviets would be seriously concerned about attacks or threatened at t acks against 
their Far Eastern Province or even against naval forces in t he waters adjacent to it have 
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increased. Thus the possibility of C.S. naval forward operations in t he Pacific appears to 
improve the U.S.' deterrent posture. The stress on forward operations has also served to 
reassure U.S. allies in East Asia of the U.S. commi tmen t to t heir defense , following some 
uncertainties during the 1970s. In contrast t o criticisms that u.s. Maritime Strategy is 
provocative and could result in attacks against Japan, it seems that u .s. strategy as 
currently defined provides a more effective means of fulfilling u.s . commitments to 
Japan. The issue of the \1aritime Strategy 's effect on crisis stability is beyond the scope 
of t his t hesis, and therefore the question of whether t he .\Iaritime Strategy is provocative 
or not cannot be answered; however , Soviet naval strategy. force capabili ty 1 and strategic 
interests suggest that attacks on Japan, in the context of a superpower conflict, would be 
likely regardless of U.S. naval strategy. 
The United States has vital interests worldwide; an upgraded navy with a well-
defined strategy can be useful for t he military protection of t hose interests against threats 
or within the context of alliance commitments. In t his decade, the u .S. has put forward a 
new naval declaratory strategy intended to enhance its ability t o protect its global 
in terests. Because of increasingly imporatant U.S. trade and alliance relationships in t he 
Pacific, as well as a larger Soviet naval presence in the region, the U.S. Navy's \1aritime 
Strategy has incorporated specific elements designed to allow a more active and capable 
response to Pacific contingencies. Many elements of t he Maritime Strategy have proved 
controversial, with analysts declaring the strategy to be irrelevant, unnecessary, not 
credible, or dangerously escalatory. Most of these criticisms appear to be poorly founded, 
and' this thesis has attempted to analyze and , where possible, refute them. Instead, the 
Maritime Strategy provides a useful framework within which t he u.S. Navy can suppor t 
U.S . interests t hrough peacetime missions and in lower-intensity conflicts, as well as 
enhancing deterrence of the Soviet Union by establishing the broad elements of a 
warfighting strategy. Naval operations in the Pacific, stressed in the Maritime Strategy, 
provide a means of securing deterrence in the region, protecting U.S. interests and allies, 
and of deterring t he Soviet Union on a global scale. 
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